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THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW ACT: PHASE I
Warren Grover*
1. Introduction
Environment and heredity are major factors in determining the
behaviour of all human beings. As a nation, which is a collection of
human beings, Canada could be said to have had a very mixed heredity
coupled with a fairly constant environment. The most obvious constant
parts of the environment have been the wall of impenetrable barrenness
to the north, the seas to the east and the west and a more powerful half-
brother to the south. There is not much one can do about the seas and
the north1 so it is natural for Canada to focus attention on its half-
brother. Canada is usually preoccupied with an endless number of real
or imagined problems emanating from the United States. The heredity
of the country, if anything, exacerbates that preoccupation .2
When a Canadian talks about foreign control, he usually means con-
trol from the United States. This can be explained simply on the basis
that the economic influence of the United States is the major pervasive
element in the Canadian economy. But I suggest the reasons are more
visceral. The Canadian who goes abroad finds he is thought of as an
American and he does not like it. He maintains that an American is one
who comes from the United States and a Canadian is something else
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University. Professor Grover has worked
for the Foreign Investment Review Agency. The opinions in this article are Professor Grover's
personal views and any similarity to the views or policies of the Agency are purely coinciden-
tal.
One can develop the north, and Canadian policies in this area have been expanding for many
years. The point I wish to make is that one cannot pass a law to decrease the problems raised by
the weather and expect the weather to obey.
2 This is particularly so in Ontario which has had a strong pro-British tradition. As the power of
the British Empire waned and the power of the United States waxed, Ontario felt itself a part of
the losing side. Quebec was able to maintain its own traditions and felt less keenly a sense of
competition with the United States. This may account for the differing views on the advisability
of foreign participation in the securities industry shown in the Bouchard Report (Quebec, 197 1)
and the Report of the Ontario Inter-Departmental Task Force on Foreign Investment (1971).
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again. 3 He admits, albeit grudgingly in many cases, that the magazines
he reads and the television he watches originate in the United States.
But he wants to believe in an identity of his own, separate from the
American. On the other hand he recognizes the great benefits Canada
has derived from American investment in Canada in terms of giving
Canadians a high standard of living. So Canada searches for some way
to establish a separate identity without losing the benefits of being the
neighbour of the world's richest nation, with whom it shares a com-
mon language and an extensive undefended, largely unregulated, bor-
der. This is one of Canada's national dreams. The Foreign Investment
Review Act could be viewed as the latest spike driven to secure that
dream. 4
It would be unfair to say that Canada is worried about only one
foreign nation controlling the Canadian economy. If one were to as-
sume that United States enterprises would willingly dispose of their
holdings in Canada to other foreigners, Canada would still view with
alarm the prospect of domination by possible successors such as the
Germans, the Japanese or the Arabs. Accordingly, it is not surprising
to find that recent5 attention has focused on the more general problem
of foreign control while recognizing the dominant position the United
States now plays in that control pattern. Both the Watkins 6 and Gray 7
Reports focused on the problems of foreign investment by any country.
It is well known, however, that foreign direct investment in Canada, as
opposed to portfolio investment, is highly concentrated in U.S. hands.
Any legislation aimed at foreign direct investment will therefore apply
most often to enterprises controlled by citizens of the United States.
3 Canada has been somewhat of a haven for disgruntled U.S. citizens such as draft dodgers, but
these persons have not really altered the Canadian perspective which, in my view, has always
been one of jealousy of the wealth and power of the United States coupled with a desire to
remain in an independent position of moral superiority, the latter perhaps somewhat self-per-
ceived.
4 With apologies to Pierre Berton whose entertaining books are full of examples of Canadian con-
cern over American domination of the railroads.
5 In the early part of this century, the concern was directed more at the United States. Sir Wilfrid
Laurier lost an election on the reciprocity issue, the slogan "No truck or trade with the
Yankees" being very much in evidence, see Carrigan, Canadian Party Platforms, 1867-1968
(Toronto, 1968) p. 61. Such a slogan would seem a bit gauche today but was relatively polite
compared to the tirades against the United States then common in the Canadian press, see Ellis,
Reciprocity 1911: A Study in Canadian American Relations (New York, 1968) Chapters X and
XI.
Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry, Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Ca-
nadian Industry (Ottawa, 1968).
Foreign Direct Investment in Canada (Ottawa, 1972).
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But direct investment does have more impact on Canadian identity
than portfolio investment, so any emphasis on direct investment is an
emphasis in the right place for several reasons.
The evolution of a foreign direct investment policy by Canada is still
in the embryonic stage. 8 Foreign direct investment can occur either by
the infusion of new foreign capital into Canada or by the reinvestment
of retained earnings by existing foreign controlled firms. These
sources can be used to establish new businesses, either by starting from
scratch or by acquiring an existing Canadian business, or they can be
used to expand existing businesses either directly or through acquisi-
tions. Probably the greatest amount of foreign direct investment now
arises as a result of investing retained earnings within the established
business. 9 There is no indication of any legislation being promulgated
federally to deal with this type of direct investment. 10 The Foreign In-
vestment Review Act does deal with acquisitions of existing busi-
nesses and with the establishment of new businesses.
The Foreign Takeovers Review Act was introduced in May 1972 as
House of Commons Bill C-201. In its original form it applied only to
takeovers of Canadian companies by foreign interests. Largely at the
insistence of the New Democratic Party, the minority Liberal Govern-
ment replaced it in 1973 with the Foreign Investment Review Act, the
change in title indicating the increased coverage of the new Bill C- 132
to include both takeovers and investments in new businesses by for-
eigners. This Bill received a great deal of attention from Committees
of both the Senate and the House of Commons in the Summer of 1973. It
was amended in several respects as it went through the House of
Commons in the Fall of 1973. It passed through the Senate unscathed in
one day in December 1973. It was designed to be proclaimed in two
separate stages. Phase I, which is the subject of this article, relates only
to takeovers. It was proclaimed in force on April 9, 1974. The second
phase was to be proclaimed in force around the end of December 1974,
but the provincial trade Ministers asked in December 1974 that the
8 A good article tracing the evolution and arguing for a stronger policy is McMillan, "After the
Gray Report: The Tortuous Evolution of Foreign Investment Policy", 20 McGill L. J. 213
(1974).
' Gray Report, pp. 24 et seq.
10 In reply to a question by Mr. Broadbent on October 18, 1974, the Prime Minister indicated
that, while reinvestment of retained earnings in an established business might ultimately be
regulated, there was no plan for such regulation at the present time. The Report of the Select
Committee on Economic and Cultural Nationalism (Ontario) has recommended that foreign
controlled firms having gross assets of $25 million or more should be subject to an annual
review by the Foreign Investment Review Agency, see Report, p. 92.
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second proclamation be delayed. Second proclamation is set for October
15, 1975, as announced in the House of Commons on July 18, 1975.
The first proclamation11 brought into effect s. 8(1) of the statute
which provides that every non-eligible person proposing to acquire
control of a Canadian business shall give notice to the Agency of such
proposal. That notice triggers a review process which culminates in the
Cabinet either allowing or refusing to allow the proposal. The process
has the following statutory stages:
(1) The non-eligible proposed acquirer files a notice with the Agency
containing the information set forth in the regulations, which is
very extensive. 12
(b) The Agency reviews the notice for completeness and, if the notice
is complete, it sends a certificate to the acquirer by registered mail,
setting out the date of the receipt of the completed notice. 13
(3) The Agency then negotiates with the acquirer with a view to ob-
taining suitable undertakings which the acquirer will agree to carry
out if the investment is eventually allowed. These undertakings are
meant to indicate the significant benefit to Canada involved in the
transaction which is the statutory standard for permitting the in-
vestment. If this procedure takes more than 60 days then the
proposed investment is deemed to be allowed. 14
(4) Once suitable undertakings are negotiated, or it becomes impossi-
ble to negotiate suitable undertakings, the Agency forwards the
file to the Minister with its recommendation. 15
(5) At any time during the negotiations the 60-day period could
elapse, so the Agency, on the direction of the Minister, may be
forced to send out a notice advising the applicant of his right to
make further representations. This notice, if sent, removes the 60-
day maximum and no new maximum time period is imposed. In
practice, 60 days is usually not long enough, so representation no-
tices have become quite common. 16
(6) From the Minister a summary of the file goes forward to the Cabi-
Technically, proclamation under s. 31(1) of the statute, 21-21 Eliz. II c. 41, brought into ef-
fect the whole statute except those parts relating to the establishment of new businesses, see
s. 31(2). Effectively this meant that first proclamation brought subsection 8(1) into force.
12 The regulations have four forms annexed to them which together make up the notice. These
forms include one setting out the information involved in the takeover in summary form, one
requiring a large amount of detail about the acquirer, one requiring detail about the target and a
fourth setting out the acquirer's plans for the future of the target.
13 S. 8(4).
14 S. 13(1).
15 This procedure is virtually dictated by s. 9.
16 S. 11(1).
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net with the Minister's recommendation as to allowance or not.
Cabinet can either allow the investment where significant benefit
to Canada is found or it can refuse to allow the investment or, if
such has not already occurred, it can cause the Minister to issue. a
representation notice. If a representation notice has been sent and
representations heard then the Cabinet must either allow or refuse
to allow the investment. 17
(7) After informing the acquirer, the order agreeing or refusing to
allow the investment is published in the Canada Gazette. 1 8
This procedure was not the one envisaged in the Gray Report. That
Report saw the Agency itself as a decision-maker. The introduction of
the Federal Cabinet into the process has caused administrative
problems of considerable magnitude, some of which are discussed
later in this article. Yet the purpose of the Act demanded a high level
of review at least for major takeovers. 1 9 That purpose is set forth in
s. 2(l) of the statute in rather ringing terms. It separates out two con-
cerns, the extent to which control of Canadian commerce has become
acquired by foreigners and the effect of such control on the ability of
Canadians to maintain effective control over their own economic en-
vironment. If these matters are of national concern, as the subsection
states, then a review of actions which could substantially increase such
economic control would logically only be undertaken at a very high
level. If one adds on the vague test for allowing such an increase, i.e.,
that the foreign investment under review result is a significant benefit to
Canada, it is not the type of judgment that could be left to civil servants
in major cases. 20
17 S. 12.
18 The question of publication has occasioned a lot of discussion in the newspapers. Under s. 14
of the statute, the amount the Agency may publish is rather limited. It is questionable whether
the real reasons for a decision by the Cabinet are ever really known anyway. Hence to publish
more than the result and, in the case of allowances, a general statement of the believed benefits
to Canada may be unrealistic. This is unsatisfactory to applicants who are searching for prece-
dents and to newspapers hungry for public disclosure. It also has the unfortunate result of es-
tablishing some law firms with many foreign clients as the real experts in the field. Expertise
can only be acquired by being involved in actual cases, if no reasons are given for decisions.
The pressure for more disclosure will, in my opinion, ultimately force a retreat from the non-
disclosure policy set out in s. 14.
19 Indeed reviews had taken place on an ad hoc basis in several instances prior to the enactment of
the statute. Two examples would be the proposed sales of Home Oil and of Denison Mines.
20 The Canadian civil service is not, in my view, held in as high regard as it should be or as the
civil services in both the United Kingdom and the United States are presently held. The old
idea of "those who can do and those who can't teach" is extended in Canada to include the
civil servants with the academics or below. At most, this denigration of the civil service is only
partly fair. Clearly a strong Review Agency is required even for the limited role now granted to
it under the statute.
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In summary, in the case of acquisitions, the acquirer must first de-
termine if the statute applies to the proposed transaction at all. To do so
he must answer three questions:
(a) am I a non-eligible person, and if so,
(b) am I proposing to acquire control of an enterprise, and if so,
(c) is that enterprise a Canadian business enterprise.
If the acquirer fits within these three tests he must then establish to the
Canadian Federal Cabinet that his proposed acquisition is of significant
benefit to Canada. But he cannot talk directly to the Cabinet. In effect
he talks to the Agency who advises the Minister who takes the matter
to Cabinet. There is no appeal from the Cabinet's decision. 21
The question as to applicability of the legislation is essentially a
legal question, the question of significant benefit is an economic and
political one. 22 The next three parts of this article deal with the ques-
tions of applicability in takeover situations, which questions are as
ineluctable to lawyers as they are incomprehensible to everyone else.
Then I have included a short incursion into the question of significant
benefit, an area whose implications are evident but where few
guidelines are available. After a brief look at the administrative
procedures and remedies, I have tried to examine some problems
designed to be paradigmatic for a reader who is so indefatigable as to
have persevered that far.
2. The First Legal Problem: Who is a Non-Eligible Person?
The most basic concept in the whole statute is the definition of a
non-eligible person. No review is contemplated in either the acquisi-
tion of a Canadian business enterprise or in the establishment of a new
business in Canada unless a non-eligible person is involved. On the
other hand, one non-eligible person will taint the whole group of which
he is a member, even if his participation is miniscule, under the word-
ing of both subsecs. (1) and (2) of s. 8. The definition of "non-eligible
person" in s. 3(1) divides itself into three parts:
(a) a "non-eligible person" individual style;
(b) a "non-eligible person" sovereign style; and
(c) a "non-eligible person" corporate style.
21 Although the Cabinet can reverse itself which it has already done once, in the application of
Canadian Bluebird International Inc. to acquire J. H. Corbeil Ltd., which was allowed in
December 1974 after having been rejected in November 1974.
22 The Agency staff has a separate division-the Rulings Division of the Compliance Branch
which deals with the applicability of the statute. The assessment of significant benefit is done
by a separate group called the Assessment Branch.
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Each of these categories has already caused problems.
Starting with the non-eligible individual, he is defined in the body of
the statute to be an individual who is neither a Canadian citizen nor a
landed immigrant within the meaning of the Immigration Act. 23 The
statute then goes on to say "and includes" Canadian citizens not ordi-
narily resident in Canada and who are members of a class of persons
prescribed by regulation. Thus, Canadian citizens not resident in
Canada may be non-eligible persons if they fall into the classes set
forth in the regulations. Those regulations provide that anyone who has
applied for citizenship of another country or has been ordinarily resi-
dent outside Canada for five years immediately preceding the date 24 is
required to give notice under s. 8(1),25 and is usually to be considered
a non-eligible person. The exceptions to the five-year rule 26 permit a
person who has been resident outside Canada for more than five years
to still qualify if he is an employee of the Canadian Government or of a
Canadian business enterprise or if he is a university student or if,
unless he has been non-resident for more than 10 years, he was ordi-
narily resident in Canada on his sixtieth birthday. Effectively there-
fore, there are four groups of "eligible" Canadian citizens:
(a) those ordinarily resident in Canada;
(b) those who have not been ordinarily resident in Canada for up to
five years before the review notice was required;
(c) those who have been non-resident for more than five years and
who are employees of a Canadian concern or university students;
(d) those who have been non-resident for more than five but less than
ten years who were resident in Canada on their sixtieth birthday.
23 Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-2, s. 2 provides in part:
"Canadian citizen" means a person who is a Canadian citizen within the meaning of the
Canadian Citizenship Act;
"immigrant" means a person who seeks admission to Canada for permanent residence;
"landing" means the lawful admission of an immigrant to Canada for permanent resi-
dence.
There appears to be no definition of "landed immigrant" nor is the phrase used in the Im-
migration Act. It must mean a person who has been lawfully admitted to Canada for permanent
residence.
The Foreign Investment Review Act is not clear as to whether the category "Canadian citi-
zen" is also modified by a reference to the Immigration Act. If it is then the cross reference to
the Canadian Citizenship Act does add some clarity to the phrase. That statute has elaborate
provisions relating to various esoteric types of Canadian citizens.
24 There is no date set forth anywhere in s. 8(I), (2) or (3).
25 The Regulations do not refer to s. 8(2) but presumably this will be fixed prior to or at the time
of second proclamation.
26 There are no exceptions to the applying for citizenship of another country rule. The regulations
were changed in April 1975. The revisions have been taken into account.
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The landed immigrants are also further divided in the statute to
make "non-eligible" those landed immigrants who have been resident
in Canada for more than one year after they become eligible to apply
for Canadian citizenship. 27
The second category of non-eligible person, a foreign sovereign,
includes both national and regional governments or any agent of any of
them. While it may be unlikely that any foreign government agency
would attempt to buy control of a Canadian business enterprise directly
if review by the Canadian Cabinet was a possibility, the situation has
probably already arisen indirectly. On January 15, 1975, Anthony
Wedgwood Benn, U.K. Secretary of State for Industry, announced
that he would be introducing a Bill to vest in an Agency of the U.K.
Government the shares of any large company in Great Britain which
was in the business of making complete aircraft (other than helicop-
ters). This nationalization of the British Aircraft Industry will presum-
ably involve an acquisition of control of Canadian subsidiaries of the
major U.K. aircraft companies. 2 8 Thus the prospect of the Canadian
Cabinet reviewing a decision of the British Cabinet appears immi-
nent.2 9
The last but most important category of "non-eligible person" is the
one of the corporate variety. Here the statute has a welter of rules,
many of which are so technical that they invite planning for avoidance.
But the start is simple. The definition says that a corporation, regard-
less of its place of incorporation, is a non-eligible person if it is "con-
trolled in any manner that results in control in fact" 3 0 by a non-eligible
person (of either the individual or sovereign variety) or by a group of
persons any member of which is a non-eligible individual or sovereign.
There is an expansion within the definition to say that the control may
be directly through the ownership of shares or indirectly through a
trust, contract or ownership of shares in another corporation. Control
27 The Bill originally used the concept of 6 years' residence in Canada as being a cut-off point
where the person was not a Canadian citizen. It was amended before third reading apparently
to take care of a person who was resident in Canada before he became "landed"; see the Cana-
dian Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C- 19, s. 10 for sorie possible examples.
28 According to the Official British Information Services Policy Statement 5/75, it is not clear
whether subsidiaries are included.
29 It should be noted that the likelihood of any showing of significant benefit to Canada seems
remote. Presumably Britain would like to increase exports to Canada and decrease imports
from Canada. Similarly if exports from the U.K. could replace products presently exported
from the Canadian subsidiary, this would be in the interests of the British Government.
30 What the words "in any manner that results in control" add to the "controlled in fact" concept
within the definition is unclarified at present.
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itself is never defined but the concentration on shareholder control in
the definition suggests that, except where the statute clearly indicates
the contrary, shareholding is to be the primary indicium of control.
As most business activity in Canada is carried on by corporations, it
is not surprising that the statute singles out that form of business for
very specific treatment. While the definition of the non-eligible per-
son, corporate variety, appears on its face to be very broad indeed, the
concept of corporate control has a very thorny history in the Courts,
particularly in cases involving the Income Tax Act. 31 The Foreign In-
vestment Review Act provisions make it clear, however, that the ques-
tion is defacto control not dejure control, the latter being the generally
accepted concept until recently under the Income Tax Act. 32 To
buttress the control concept the statute introduces a set of presumptive
threshholds. These are found initially in s. 3(2). That subsection
provides that a corporation "is, unless the contrary is established" 33 a
non-eligible person where 5 per cent of the voting shares 34 are owned
by:
(a) one non-eligible person, individual variety;
(b) one non-eligible person, sovereign variety; or
(c) one corporation incorporated elsewhere than in Canada.
Disregarding technical difficulties such as the words "owned
31 See Materials on Canadian Income Tax, 2nd ed., (Toronto, De Boo) pp. 709 et seq. The con-
cept is important for taxation purposes because of the small business deduction allowable on
the first $100,000 of active business income in Canadian controlled private companies. If two
corporations are associated, which essentially means that they are under common control, they
must apportion the deduction available. If there is no common control they are each entitled to
the full deduction. The various shareholding schemes devised by lawyers to ensure that one
corporation is not associated with another are too numerous to attempt even a superficial cover-
age. It is probably fair to say that the Courts, aided by amendments to the Income Tax Act,
have become less charitable to the taxpayer in the last 25 years, cf., M.N.R. v. Wrights' Cana-
dian Ropes Ltd., [1947] A.C. 109, [1947] 1 D.L.R. 721, [1947] C.T.C. 1, and M.N.R. v.
Consolidated Holding Co. Ltd., (1971), 23 D.L.R. (3d) 546, [1974] S.C.R. 419, [1972] 72
D.T.C. 6007; Matheson, "Corporate Control Concepts and Tax Reform", XX Can. Tax J. 45
(1972).
32 See the dissent of Spence, J., in Consolidated Holding Co. Ltd., supra, footnote 31.
33 Some concern has been expressed from time to time as to whom the "establishing" must be
done. It would seem that, in the event that the point becomes relevant in a Court proceeding
(e.g., on an application for an injunction under s. 19) the "establishing" would have to be
done by the alleged non-eligible person to the Court. On the other hand, if it is a question
whether the Minister ought to issue an opinion under s. 4(l) as to the eligibility the "es-
tablishing" would have to be done to the Minister.
34 The subsection technically reads "5% or more of the voting rights ordinarily exercisable at
meetings of shareholders of the corporation".
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by", 3 5 it is immediately apparent that this is a very low threshhold in-
deed. While the threshhold was designed to change the burden of
proof3 6 it does more than that because the wording defines the corpora-
tion as a non-eligible person unless the contrary is established-it does
not allow for any balancing of probabilities.
The second threshhold in s. 3(2) relates to aggregate holdings by
non-eligible individuals and sovereigns. In this case the magic number
is 25 per cent of the voting shares for a corporation whose shares are
publicly traded and 40 per cent of the voting shares of a corporation
whose shares are not publicly traded. There is no suggestion that the
shareholders whose holdings add up to the magic number must some-
how be part of an identifiable group. Again the threshhold is very low
for many corporations who consider themselves to be thoroughly
Canadian. But it is usually not very difficult to "establish" that control
does not reside in a scattered group with no connecting strings. The ef-
fect of the threshholds nevertheless may be to put some corporations to
what they will view as needless expense to establish the obvious. 3 7
Two subsections of the Act have an important impact on the
threshhold problem. 38 The most important of these is s. 3(6)(c), which
provides, in effect, that the acquisition of a right, whether contingent
or vested, under a contract to acquire or to control the voting rights at-
tached to shares puts the person in favour of whom the right runs in the
same position vis- -vis control of the corporation as if he owned the
shares. That paragraph is modified by para. (d.2) which provides that
the corporation is not itself a non-eligible person by reason only of the
35 The ownership question is a considerable problem when many shares are registered in the
names of nominees. For example, investors in France seem to hold their shares through a
nominee called SICOVAM which often shows on the share register of a public company as a
substantial shareholder.
36 See Mr. Gillespie's remarks, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking,
Trade and Commerce (1973), 23:26.
37 In various key sector industries a so-called 25-10 formula has been established over the past
few years. That formula allows foreigners in the aggregate to own up to but not over 25 per
cent of the voting shares of a corporation within the key sector and any one foreign individual
to own up to but over 10 per cent of the voting shares, see for example, the Bank Act, R.S.C.
1970, c. B-I, s. 56; the Loan Companies Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-12, s. 45; Regulations
passed under the Securities Act, (Ontario), 0. Reg. 600/74; In the Matter of DuPont Glore
Forgan Canada Limited, [1974] Ont. Sec. Comm. Bulletin 133. It is not clear why the 10 per
cent rule was lowered to 5 per cent under the Foreign Investment Review Act, although it is
only a presumptive level and does not include "associates" under the Foreign Investment
Review Act. These two distinctions do make it quite a different test.
38 Reference could also be made to s. 3(7)(a) which states that a "group of persons" is not to be
interpreted to mean everyone who owns shares unless they act in concert. This seems self-
evident.
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fact that a person has a right under para. (c). It would seem that the
acquisition of the right may constitute a reviewable transaction al-
though, if the right does not in fact result in the exercise of control,
then the corporation to which the right applies is not a non-eligible cor-
poration merely because of the existence of the right.
This rather convoluted expression of legislative intent may be clari-
fied by two examples. If a person acquires a right to obtain 60 per cent
of the authorized capital of a Canadian corporation upon the happening
of certain contingencies then the acquisition of the right would consti-
tute a reviewable transaction if the acquirer was itself a non-eligible
person. But if, in fact, the acquirer of the right did not control the cor-
poration, the right not having been exercised, the corporation would
retain its eligible status so long as it was controlled by eligible persons
despite any review of the granting of the right itself. On the other hand,
if the presently controlling shareholders of a corporation are non-elig-
ible persons, then the transfer of the voting rights pertaining to their
shares would constitute the acquirer the "owner" of the shares even if
the economic interests still lay with the original owners. If the acquirer
was a non-eligible person then the corporation would remain non-elig-
ible even though the control had shifted. The voting rights and the
ownership of the shares are now either in fact or because of the deem-
ing clause held by the acquirer and the corporation remains non-
elegible. It is not "only" because of the acquisition of voting rights
that the corporation is within the definition of non-eligibility. 3 9
The second subsection deals with the reliability of share registers in
determining Canadian ownership of minor shareholdings. Under
s. 3(5) it is provided that the Minister shall accept, as evidence that the
shares in question are owned by an eligible individual, the fact that the
address of the shareholder on the share register is shown to be within
Canada if the registered holder holds less than 1 per cent of the issued
shares and if the Minister is supplied with a statement signed by
responsible officers of the company to the effect that the persons sign-
ing the statement have no reason to believe that the shares are owned
by non-eligible individuals. This subsection is of limited utility
because it does not apply to shares registered in the name of a corpora-
tion and it does not apply to holdings of greater than I per cent even if
39 Section 3(6) is discussed again infra under the heading "The Second Legal Problem: Acquisi-
tion of Control".
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such holdings are in the name of customary nominees. 40 Even in the
case of holdings smaller than I per cent it only establishes a rebuttable
presumption.
Section 3(6)(b. 1) puts an upper limit on the tainting of a control
group by the inclusion of non-eligible members. If a group controls the
corporation and over 50 per cent of the voting shares of the corporation
are held by members of the group who are eligible persons then the
corporation is deemed to be "eligible" unless the group includes non-
eligible members in excess of 20 per cent of the number of members of
the group or non-eligible persons hold more than 20 per cent of the
voting shares of the corporation. While this may appear to be only a
minor concession to control groups, it is vitally important as the statute
without this paragraph would allow a group to be tainted by any one
member of the group being non-eligible. This often happens in Can-
adian families.
It has been recognized for decades 4 1 that control of widely-held cor-
porations is not in fact at the shareholder level. The Act takes some
cognizance of this concept in s. 3(7)(b) and (c). Paragraph (b)on a fast
reading would appear to say that if there is no control at the share-
holder level then the board of directors is presumed to control the cor-
poration. But this halcyon interpretation is befuddled by the closing
words of the paragraph which state that the presumption is only valid
"in the absence of any evidence that the corporation is in fact con-
trolled by some other person or group of persons". The introduction of
the word "any" is most unfortunate. It would seem to mean that if
there is some tittle of evidence that the corporation is in fact controlled
by one strong member of the board to whom other board members
regularly kowtow then the presumption in favour of director control no
longer exists despite the fact no other control has been established on
the basis of all the available evidence.
Assuming that a corporation can bring itself within the two tests for
director control, namely no shareholder control and no other person or
group of persons in control, then para. (c) completes the picture. It
specifically provides that if individuals who are themselves non-elig-
40 It is very common for shares to be held by various Canadian chartered banks and investment
dealers as nominees of their clients. Most shareholder lists of widely-held Canadian public cor-
porations would show several such nominee accounts to be in excess of I per cent of the issued
shares. There is no provision in any relevant statute to permit a corporation to demand from the
nominee the names or nationalities of the beneficial owners.
41 The usual reference is to Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property
(New York, 1932).
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ible persons comprise no more than 20 per cent of the number of direc-
tors on the board then the company is deemed to be "eligible".
Conversely if such non-eligible directors comprise 50 per cent or more
of the total number of directors then the corporation is deemed to be
non-eligible. In the twilight zone between 20 per cent and 50 per cent
the corporation is eligible if "it is established that no members of that
body" who are non-eligible persons "and who exceed 20% of the total
number of members of that body act in concert". Thus a corporation
which has more than 20 per cent of directors in the non-eligible cate-
gory must establish that the group do not "act in concert". 42 This
phrase has occasioned some difficulty in practice as directors usually
arrive at a mutually acceptable plan of action for every important cor-
porate decision. It would seem sensible to treat the phrase as meaning a
course of action that has been planned and settled between the non-
eligible directors in question before the board meeting at which the
issues are to be discussed. 43 Thus, if three officers of a large non-elig-
ible corporate shareholder are directors of a Canadian corporation they
would "act in concert" if they regularly agree before the meeting on
what stance they will assume on each item on the agenda. 44
While the welter of deeming and threshhold provisions are difficult
to sort through, there is a specific provision in s. 4(1) to seek a status
opinion from the Minister which is binding upon him for two years if
the material facts remain the same. An application for such a status
opinion would be necessary if the acquiring corporation exceeds the
threshhold levels because the Minister is required to treat such an
acquirer as non-eligible until the contrary is established. Thus if an
acquisition were contemplated, the Minister would be on sound ground
in issuing a demand 45 or in seeking injunctive relief. 46 While the ac-
quiring corporation might then establish that it was not a non-eligible
42 The phrase "act in concert" is also used in s. 3(7)(a) but one gains no assistance in interpret-
ing its meaning by looking at that paragraph.
43 The phrase "concerted action" was defined in State v. Jessup & More Paper Co. (1913), 88
A. 449, 451 (Del. Sup. Ct.), a relator action by a shareholder to force disclosure of certain cor-
porate information. Woolley, J., said concerted action was one that "has been planned,
arranged, adjusted, agreed upon and settled between parties acting together in pursuance of
some design or in accordance with some scheme". This definition has been subsequently
approved in Rock Creek Oil Corp. v. Moore (1931), 41 S.W. 2d. 501, 504, (Tex. C.A.) and in
Stone v. Wingo (1969), 416 F. 2d. 857, 860 (6th C.C.A.).
44 The fact that they are officers of the same minority shareholder may be evidence that they
would normally act in concert, see Glover, "Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act", 29
Bus. Lawyer 805 (1974), at p. 807, footnote 16.
45 S. 8(3).
46 S. 19.
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person, the cost of doing so would be considerably higher. 4 7 On the
other hand, where none of the presumptions in the statute as to non-
eligibility are triggered it has become common for the acquirer's coun-
sel to furnish to the selling shareholders on closing an eligibility
opinion for the acquiring corporation.
3. The Second Legal Problem: Acquisition of Control
Once a potential applicant under the statute has decided as a status
matter, that he is clearly a non-eligible person, the second question to
be answered so far as acquisitions are concerned 48 is whether control
has been acquired. The statute provides that control may only be
acquired in one of two ways, the acquisition of shares or the acquisi-
tion of substantially all of the assets of the target business, 49 although
amalgamations are included as a form of acquisition of control which
may be subject to the review process in another provision. 50 Accord-
ingly, the entering into of a supply contract or of an output contract
which in fact shifts the control of a Canadian corporation into foreign
hands is not a reviewable transaction even though the Canadian cor-
poration thereupon becomes a non-eligible person. The definition of
"control" for the purpose of determining eligibility is much wider
than the concept of control in the definition of acquisition of control.
This is needlessly confusing. The result is that a shift of control in fact
may not trigger a review although the eligibility status of the under-
lying corporation has changed.5 1
In order to make it clear that different control concepts are involved
than in status questions, the threshhold levels are restated in a slightly
different form. Thus the acquisition of 5 per cent of the voting shares
by any person or group of persons52 is the acquisition of control of a
41 On the other hand a confident eligible corporation may decide that a speedier resolution of the
problem is available even if at an increased cost. The injunction under s. 19 can be brought
forward on a 48-hour notice basis which is faster than the mail usually gets delivered in Ot-
tawa.
48 Under s. 8(2) the questions become whether a new business has been established and if so
whether it is related to any existing business of the potential applicant. "Relatedness" is the
subject-matter of a guideline which was issued at the time second proclamation was announ-
ced.
4 S. 3(3)(a). In the case of an asset acquisition the "substantially all" rule must be modified by
cross referring to s. 3(6)(g) discussed infra.
10 S. 3(3)(e).
51 One obvious example would be the assignment of the management contract of an incorporated
mutual fund to a non-eligible person, which is a common way of transferring control of a mu-
tual fund, see Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F. 2d. 1337.
52 The reader will recall there was no group concept in the non-eligible person 5 per cent
threshhold, 25 per cent being the relevant number for a group. The 5 per cent threshhold is
very low indeed in this case.
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publicly traded corporation unless the contrary is established and the
magic number is 20 per cent in the case of a corporation whose shares
are not publicly traded. 53 In addition, the acquisition of more than 50
per cent of the voting shares is deemed to be the acquisition of control
and there is no possibility of rebutting the presumption, unless the
acquirer already had control in fact.5 4 Furthermore, there is a step-
transaction inclusion so that an acquisition done in one or more trans-
actions, even if some of the transactions predated the Act, can give rise
to an acquisition that makes the whole series of transactions into one
reviewable transaction. 55 Thus a series of transactions which results in
the acquisition of over 5 per cent of the shares of a publicly traded cor-
poration by a non-eligible person will be considered to be an acquisi-
tion of control unless the contrary is established and if the acquirer or
group of acquirers succeeds in acquiring more than 50 per cent of the
shares, there is an irrebuttable presumption of an acquisition of con-
trol. 56
53 It is worth noting that in s. 3(3)(b)(i) the acquisition of less than 5 per cent of a publicly traded
corporation and less than 20 per cent of any other corporation is presumed not, from that fact
alone, to constitute an acquisition of control.
54 The wording of the paragraph leaves something to be desired because the exception only works
for the corporation then acquiring the shares. Thus if a non-eligible corporation, X Co., owns
all the shares of both Y Co. and Z Co., the transfer of the shares of Y Co. to Z Co. appears to
be reviewable under s. 3(3)(d) despite the fact that ultimate control has not changed. This
results because the acquirer (Z Co.) had no control before it acquired the 50 per cent. If the
transaction were somehow carried out so that there was a transfer of actual control to Z Co.
first (which might not be reviewable if neither assets nor shares were transferred), then
subsequent acquisition of the shares would not be a reviewable transaction. This type of trans-
action, where form appears to govern over substance, is a frequent problem in this technical
area of the statute.
55 S. 3(8). Quaere if the section could be read the other way so that a series of transactions, some
of which were reviewable but which ultimately resulted in the establishment of Canadian con-
trol would not be reviewable at all. This would appear possible where the transactions were all
contingent one upon the other.
56 That majority share ownership may not amount to control in fact was demonstrated in Teck
Corp. Ltd. v. Millar (1972), 33 D.L.R. 288, [1973] 2 W.W.R. 385 (B.C.S.C.), commented
upon by Frank Iacobucci, "The Exercise of Directors' Powers:-The Battle of Afton Mines",
II Osgoode Hall L.J. 353. It should also be noted that there is a tag-end to s. 3(3)(d) which
says that the acquisition of over 50 per cent of the shares of X Limited will not necessarily taint
a joint venture to which X Limited is a party unless the joint venture was set up to avoid the
provisions of the Foreign Investment Review Act. Thus if the non-eligible person wished to
take part in a joint venture designed to acquire control of a Canadian business enterprise, the
exception in s. 3(3)(d) would not allow the intent of the statute to be frustrated by the establish-
ment of a Canadian corporation as a partner in the joint venture which partner the non-eligible
person would acquire control of only after the joint venture succeeded in acquiring control of
the target Canadian business enterprise. This is one of many examples where the statute has the
appearance of extreme technicality thereby encouraging lawyers and others who are attuned to
the intricacies of tax law to draw a parallel between the Foreign Investment Review Act and the
Income Tax Act.
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Before turning to the extensions on and the exceptions to the basic
formulae for control acquisition, it is worth noting a peculiarity in the
definition of acquisition of control. It is only in the case of a "Can-
adian business enterprise that is a Canadian business carried on by a
corporation" that the acquisition of shares can be an acquisition of
control. In all other cases control can only be acquired by the acquisi-
tion of "substantially all the property used in carrying on the business
in Canada". But "Canadian business" is defined to include, in the
corporate case, only corporations incorporated in Canada. A corpora-
tion incorporated outside Canada, even if doing business only in
Canada, is a "Canadian branch business" not a "Canadian business".
Thus, although both a Canadian branch business and a Canadian busi-
ness are both Canadian business enterprises, there would only be a
"Canadian business enterprise that is a Canadian business carried on
by a corporation" if the corporation were incorporated in Canada. 57
A significant extension to the concept of acquisition of control may
result through s. 3(6)(h). That paragraph provides that a business
carried on by a corporation that is controlled by another corporation
shall be deemed to be carried on by the controlling corporation as well
as by the controlled corporation. Thus if a multi-national enterprise is
based in the United States, the U.S. parent of the Canadian subsidiary
is deemed to be carrying on the Canadian business. If there are only
two tiers (i.e., parent and subsidiary) the result would seem to be that
the acquisition of substantially all of the assets of the parent, including
the shares of the Canadian subsidiary, would be a reviewable transac-
tion but the acquisition of control of the parent by a share acquisition
would not be a reviewable transaction so far as the Canadian authori-
ties are concerned. This results because a share acquisition is only
caught by the definition of "acquisition of control" if the target cor-
51 This technicality is an invitation to establish foreign corporations to transact business in
Canada. Then a share sale by the ultimate owner to a non-eligible person would not be caught
by the statute. If the foreign corporation was a resident of Canada as that term is interpreted at
common law (see, Bedford Overseas Freighters Ltd. v. M.N.R., [ 1970] C.T.C. 69, 70 D.T.C.
6072) then the branch tax provisions found in s. 219 of the Income Tax Act would likely not
impact very heavily although the corporation could not be considered a "Canadian corpora-
tion" if incorporated after 197 1, see s. 89(1 )(a) of the Income Tax Act. If the ultimate owners
of the corporation were Canadians this ruse would deprive them of the small business deduc-
tion under s. 125 of the Income Tax Act as it is only available to Canadian corporations. If the
ultimate control is foreign, however, the establishment of the Canadian business through a
foreign incorporated subsidiary is not beyond the realm of possibility if a sale of the shares of
the subsidiary is contemplated in the relatively near future. Beyond the relatively near future, it
is almost inevitable that the statute will be amended.
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poration is incorporated in Canada. 58 If, however, there were three
tiers (i.e., parent, foreign child and Canadian grandchild) then the
acquisition of shares in the foreign child would be the acquisition of all
the Canadian assets of the parent, which parent was deemed to be car-
rying on business in Canada, and the transaction is then reviewable.
59
Turning to the extensions to the basic acquisition of control concept,
there are at least five, without inventing any permutations or combina-
tions, as follows:
(1) An amalgamation of two or more corporations, the effect of which
is to continue the amalgamating corporations as one6 0 is deemed to
be the acquisition of control by the amalgamated corporation of the
business formerly carried on by the amalgamating corporations,
except in the case of corporate reorganizations.
6 1
(2) Where the acquisition is by a person as a trustee the acquisition is
deemed to have been made by a corporation of which the share-
holders are the beneficiaries of the trust and the directors are the
trustees of the trust.
62
(3) The acquisition of a leasehold interest in any property used in car-
51 There is a contrary argument which would run somewhat as follows:
(1) The parent is a Canadian branch business because of s. 3(6)h).
(2) The acquisition of control of the parent resulted in the indirect acquisition of all the prop-
erty used by the parent in carrying on business in Canada, to wit the shares of the sub-
sidiary.
(3) While the word "indirect" is not used in this part of the statute it is to be implied in appro-
priate cases in order to stop people doing indirectly what they could not do directly.
This argument would have much force if the real motive for acquiring the shares of the parent.
as opposed to its assets was the Foreign Investment Review Act. But if the real motive for ac-
quiring shares was the ease of transaction or foreign tax considerations, the argument has less
force. In the Senate Committee debates immediately before the passage of the Bill it was
argued that the purchase of 10 per cent of the shares of a U.S. parent on the New York Stock
Exchange would definitely trigger a review, see Report of the Senate Standing Committee on
Banking, Trade and Commerce, December I1, 1973, pp. 23:7 et seq. This appears to be at
least open to question.
59 If this is the result of the clear wording of the Act then perhaps, as Mr. Gillespie promised the
Senate on another specific but related point, the Act will be amended. For the Act should be
read in the spirit of its purposes as set out in s. 2(1) and not to dissect its language to the point
of enquiring how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.
6o This concept of confluent stream amalgamation has finally been authoritatively accepted in
Canada, R. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co. Ltd. (1974), 43 D.L.R. (3d) 393, 15 C.C.C. (2d) 193,
13 C.P.R. (2d) 97 (S.C.C.).
61 S. 3(3)(c). The corporate reorganization exception is discussed, infra.
62 S. 3(3)(f). This equating of a trust to a corporation is also used in the foreign accrual property
income provisions of the Income Tax Act.
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rying on a business is deemed to be the acquisition of that prop-
erty. 6
3
(4) A part of a business that is capable of being carried on separately is
itself a Canadian business enterprise and therefore the concept in
the definition of "acquisition of control" that one must acquire
"substantially all of the property used in carrying on the business
in Canada" is cut down considerably. 64
(5) The acquisition under a contract of a right that could eventually
lead to an acquisition of control is itself an acquisition of control,
subject to several exceptions. 65
Of these five only the last one is really necessary to discuss more fully
in a survey article such as this. There is no more technical or difficult
group of sections in the whole statute than the ones related to the
acquisition of a right under a contract. It appears that the pivotal
s. 3(6)(c) was derived from that well-known model of luminosity, the
Income Tax Act. But the draftsman of the Foreign Investment Review
Act was determined to surpass the Income Tax Act draftsman. Section
3(6)(c) provides, in so far as rights to shares are concerned, 66 as
follows:
a person who has a right under a contract, whether written or oral and whether
express or implied, in equity or otherwise, either immediately or in the future and
either absolutely or contingently,
(i) to, or to acquire or dispose of, shares of a corporation, or to control the
voting rights attaching to shares of a corporation.
(except any such right arising under a contract that is entered into after the com-
ing into force of this Act and that provides that the right is not exercisable until
the death of an individual designated therein or any such right that is contingent
upon the Governor in Council allowing the investment that is the subject of a
right), shall be deemed to have the same position in relation to the control of the
corporation as if he owned the shares ....
The emphasized portions reproduce the complete wording of
63 S. 3(6)(e). This paragraph may be important in sale-leaseback transactions if one can read
s. 3(8) to say that you can ignore the intermediate steps if you eventually wind up in the right
place. Thus if a Canadian business was "sold" to a non-eligible financial institution but leased
back to the original Canadian owner would the provisions mean that there was no reviewable
transaction? If this was purely a financing transaction, such a result should cause no alarm. It
can also be argued that a sale-leaseback is not caught anyway if the control of the business
never leaves Canada. The definition of acquisition of control is not structured to force a con-
trary result as it is an exclusion type definition i.e., it says control "may only be acquired". It
does not say that any specific event must be considered an acquisition of control regardless of
the fact that control has not changed.
64 S. 3(6)(g). Section 3(6)(f) has a parallel concept for a business partly carried on in Canada and
partly carried on elsewhere.
65 S. 3(6)(c).
66 There are similar provisions with respect to rights to acquire the assets of a business.
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s. 251(5)(b) of the Income Tax Act with one or two changes in
prepositions only. That subsection (or its predecessor under the old In-
come Tax Act) spawned at least two Tax Review Board cases in 1974
alone.6 7 With all the extra verbiage added perhaps it will provoke even
more litigation under the Foreign Investment Review Act. But the
draftsman did not rest there. 68 He went on to set forth three variations
in addition to the two contained in the parentheses of the pivotal
paragraph itself as follows:
(a) there is an exception where the right is acquired to safeguard a
loan;
(b) despite the fact that an acquisition of control may be deemed to
occur because of the acquisition of the right, the corporation to
whose shares the right relates is not itself made into a non-eligi-
ble person only because of that deemed acquisition (though it
may be one for other reasons); and
(c) where a right is acquired that is within the pivotal paragraph (or
within the exception relating to safe-guarding loans) the exercise
of the right is deemed not to constitute the acquisition of the
shares to which the right is related.
In case all this seems crystal clear, the reader might ask himself if the
granting of a right of first refusal is caught by the wording of the pivo-
tal paragraph. 69
In addition to the five extensions with the five variations to the fifth
extension, there are also five exceptions to the basic definition of
acquisition of control, as follows:
(1) The first exception, which has been mentioned already, is that the
acquisition of less than the threshhold numbers is not the acquisi-
tion of control standing by itself. 70
(2) The second exception relates to a share acquisition by a securities
dealer in the normal course of his business. 71
67 See Toric Optical Ltd. v. M.N.R., [1974] C.T.C. 2095, 74 D.T.C. 1054; St. George House of
Vision v. M.N.R., [1974] C.T.C. 2211,74 D.T.C. 1155.
68 To be fair to the draftsman, paras. (d. 1) and (d. 2) of s. 3(6) were probably added in response
to suggestions made in various submissions received, see, the various presentations before
the House of Commons Committee, Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence of the Stand-
ing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs, (1973) Issues No. 26 et seq.
69 At least one can argue that it is not a right to acquire under a contract but rather the right to be
asked if one would like to acquire, see Corbin, On Contracts, s. 261 and the cases cited
therein.
70 S. 3(3)(b)(i). This exception seems self evident.
71-S. 3(3)(b)(ii). This is presumably meant to be an underwriting exemption. It is drawn more
broadly than that for people whose primary business is trading in securities. Whether it could
be used by pension plans, mutual funds or other financial intermediaries is unclear but the
likely answer would appear to be in the negative. Thus if a foreign mutual fund bought 6 per
cent of the issued shares of a publicly traded corporation the presumptive threshhold would still
apply.
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(3) The third exception, which may not be an exception at all, relates
to the acquisition and holding of land even if there is an intention
of disposing of it at a profit.7 2 This exception was presumably in-
troduced to counter the decisions in some tax cases7 3 that have
held that acquiring land with an intention of disposing of it makes
the disposition profits taxable as business income. It is not incon-
ceivable that one could extrapolate from these decisions to say that
the acquisition of the land was the acquisition of a business. The
wording of this subsection is a trifle awkward but on a careful
reading it would seem that whether or not funds are expended to
maintain the land in the condition in which it was acquired and
even if funds are expended to improve the land for the personal use
or enjoyment of the owners, the holding of the land is not the car-
rying on of a business. Thus the subsection may have two pur-
poses: to provide that the acquisition of land with a view to
disposition is not the acquisition of a business and also to provide
that the holding of land, even if funds are expended for specified
limited purposes, is not the carrying on of a business. It is
suggested that this is a better interpretation7 4 than saying that the
acquisition could be the acquisition of a business although the
holding subsequent to the acquisition was not the carrying on of a
business.
(4) The fourth exception is for the acquisition of shares by a venture
capitalist if the acquisition is upon terms and conditions "not in-
consistent" with those prescribed by the Minister. The terms and
conditions of the venture capital exemption7 5 define, in effect,
what a venture capitalist is and set outside limits on the terms and
conditions he may impose on the corporation to which he is
supplying venture capital. The definition of venture capitalist has
three definite tests;
(i) the capitalist does not invest more than $10 million in iny
single Canadian business corporation;
72 S. 3(9).
73Regal Heights Limited v. M.N.R. (1960), 26 D.L.R. (2d) 51, [1960] S.C.R. 902, [1960]
C.T.C. 384, 60 D.T.C. 1270, is the seminal case on secondary intention which is the most dif-
ficult test in this area. The Income Tax Act defines business to include "an adventure or con-
cern in the nature of trade" which words do not appear in the Foreign Investment Review Act.
Thus the tax cases may be of little relevance.
14 This seems to be the position taken by Hayden and Bums, Foreign Investment in Canada,
15013 (herein cited as Hayden and Bums).
75 Published in the Canada Gazette, Part I of April 27, 1974.
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(ii) the capitalist makes available venture capital in Canada in the
ordinary course of his business; and
(iii) the capital is provided substantially in the form of equity partic-
ipation or subordinated debt.
There are three other "normally" tests to be satisfied as well
which are:
(i) the capitalist does not normally acquire a majority of the
shares of the corporation in which he invests:
(ii) the venture capitalist normally sells the shares he has
purchased within 5 or 10 years of acquisition; and
(iii) no single venture, at original cost, normally represent more
than 20 percent of his venture capital portfolio.
If one is a venture capitalist within this definition then one can
make an investment by acquiring shares of a corporation, other
than a corporation principally in the real estate business, if one is
prepared to dispose of the shares (and of control) within the time
limits set out in the "terms and conditions", which terms vary ac-
cording to the size of the business and the size of the holding of the
venture capitalist. If the average annual net income of the corpora-
tion invested in has been less than $200,000 in its three most
recent fiscal years or if at least half of the investment is made in
common shares then control must be divested from the capitalist
within 10 years and his percentage ownership of any class of vot-
ing securities cannot exceed 33 per cent at that time. At the end of
13 years he must get the percentage ownership down to a max-
imum of 20 per cent. If the average net income of the corporation
to be invested in exceeds the $200,000 figure and less than 50 per
cent of the investment is in common shares, divestment of control
must occur within 5 years, by which time he cannot own more than
15 per cent of any class of voting securities. At the end of 7 years
the percentage ownership must be down to a maximum of 10 per
cent. 
76
(5) The fifth, and perhaps most important, exception relates to the
acquisition of control to safeguard a loan or rights of redemption
76 There are other requirements, such as filing certain prescribed material, the inclusion of which
would only serve to make this article more prolix. The reasons behind a venture capital exemp-
tion stem from the difficulty small but growing businesses have when they are too big to
remain private but too small to go public, see A. G. Griffin, "Merchant Banking-A Canadian
Requirement", Special Lecures of the Law Society of Upper Canada (Corporate and Securities
Law) (1972) 273, 276; the Report of the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance (1964)
Chapter 12 (commonly referred to as the Porter Report). There is no published material relat-
ing to the use, if any, being made of this exemption by venture capitalists.
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attaching to shares of a corporation if, in both cases, there is an en-
forceable agreement which provides that the control will be
divested by the acquirer and vested in persons at arm's length to
the acquirer upon the satisfaction of some condition that is likely to
occur. It should be noted that this section is not confined to an
acquisition of shares, although that would be the normal expecta-
tion for its use. It affords an interesting contrast, and planning pos-
sibilities, to a venture capitalist who is not prepared to live by the
relatively rigid "terms and conditions" promulgated by the Minis-
ter. 77
4. The Third Legal Problem:
What is a Canadian Business Enterprise
Assuming that the acquirer has decided he is a non-eligible person
and that his proposed acquisition is an acquisition of control, there is
one other basic question: whether the target business is a Canadian
business enterprise. The statutory framework in this area is unencum-
bered with presumptive levels but the difficulties of interpretation are
no less horrendous. A Canadian business enterprise is defined 78 to
mean "a business that is either a Canadian business or a Canadian
branch business". Presumably the words "a business that is" are
redundant so one can turn immediately to the definitions of Canadian
business and Canadian branch business. A Canadian branch business is
defined 79 to be a business carried on in Canada by a corporation incor-
porated outside Canada that maintains an establishment in Canada to
which employees of the corporation employed in connection with the
business ordinarily report to work. This definition seems to require the
satisfaction of four separate conditions, as well as the factual question
of the jurisdiction of incorporation, as follows: 80
(1) The foreign corporation must maintain an establishment in Can-
ada. An "establishment" is nowhere defined 81 and is bound to
raise questions in view of the frequency of the use of the term
"permanent establishment" in tax treaties8 2 and the judicial pro-
7 S. 3(3)(b)(iv).7 8 S. 3(l).
79 Ibid.
0 In addition to the more general problem of what is a "business carried on in Canada".
81 There are a few judicial decisions on the meaning of "'establishment" as that term has been
used in other statutes, particularly statutes relating to conditions of employment, but I have
found none in which the "establishment" was not obviously so, e.g., a hospital in Jarvis v.
Oshawa Hospital, [1931] 4 D.L.R. 914, [1931] O.R. 482 or three offices and a repair shop in
Zehring v. Brown Materials (1943), 43 F. Supp. 740,743 (D.C. Calif.).
82 Indeed the term is defined in 16 of the 17 tax treaties to which Canada is a party that I have ex-
amined, the sole exception being the tax agreement with Jamaica.
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nouncements in the disputes that have arisen as a result thereof. 83
In the Foreign Investment Review Act the fact that employees
must report to work at the establishment indicates that it must be at
least an office or fixed place of business maintained by the foreign
corporation.
(2) Employees of the corporation must report to work at the permanent
establishment. This involves the old distinction between contracts
of service and contract for services, which have been a source of
much litigation over many decades, the Income Tax Act having
spawned more cases recently than any other source. 8 4A subsidiary
question, which may invite artificial planning, is the concept that
the employees must be employees of "the corporation". If a
planner were to separate the employment function of a business
into a separate entity from the one which maintains the establish-
ment there is an argument that the definition of Canadian branch
business has been avoided.
(3) The employees reporting to work at the establishment must be
employed in connection with the business. If these words add any-
thing, they must mean that it is possible to have employees of the
corporation reporting for work at the establishment who are
employed in something else other than the business. It is difficult
to discern just what planning opportunities may arise from this pe-
culiarity.
(4) The employees must "ordinarily" report for work at the establish-
ment. Presumably if an office were rented but there were only
travelling salesmen involved in the business plus a telephone
answering service, so there were no employees at the establish-
ment on a regular basis, then the fact that the salesmen used the of-
fice for certain meetings with customers or suppliers, would not
make the foreign corporation's activities into a Canadian branch
business.
83 See Consolidated Premium Iron Ores v. C.I.R., (U.S. Tax Court, 1975), 57 D.T.C. 1147, af-
firmed 59 D.T.C. I 112(6thCir. C.A.); Tara Exploration and Development Co. v. M.N.R., 70
D.T.C. 6370, 6378 (Exch. Ct.) affirmed 72 D.T.C. 6288, 6290 (S.C.C.); American
Wheelabrater& Equipment Corporation v. M.N.R., 51 D.T.C. 285 (Tax A.B.).
14 The deductions available under the Income Tax Act are more extensive, generally speaking,
for non-employees than they are for employees. A convenient listing and short review of the
major cases in England is found in the judgment of McKenna, J., in Ready Mixed Concrete
(South East), Ltd. v. Minister of Pensions and National Ins.. [1968] 1 All E.R. 433 (Q.B.D.)
cited with approval by Jackett, P., in Alexander v. M.N.R., 70 D.T.C. 6007. For a more
recent case involving receipts by an administrative officer from the university by which he was
employed where the receipts were in respect of marking papers in courses he did not teach,
see, Elliott v. M.N.R., 71 D.T.C. 106 (Tax Rev. Bd.).
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More important than a Canadian branch business is a "Canadian
business" which is defined 85 in three ways, namely:
(1) A business carried on by a corporation incorporated in Canada that
maintains a Canadian establishment to which employees ordinarily
report for work. The wording for this corporate variety of Can-
adian business is identical to the wording used to define a Cana-
dian branch business so the problems need not be restated.(2) A business carried on in Canada by an individual who is either a
Canadian citizen or a person ordinarily resident in Canada.
Because of the inclusion of only individuals and corporations, the
avoidance planner notices that foreign trusts, partnerships and in-
dividuals may not be covered. Trusts and partnerships are well-
known vehicles in the real estate business. Their use may become
more widespread.(3) Any number of individuals or corporations, if any one of the num-
ber is a corporation described in (1) above or an individual
described in (2) above, who either alone or jointly or in concert
with one or more other individuals or corporations of the same ilk
are in a position to control the conduct of the business. The words
"in concert" have been discussed above in another context. 86 But
the final test in this definition, namely controlling not the business
but controlling "the conduct of the business" suggest some form
of day-to-day control. A corporation cannot control 87 conduct ex-
cept through some individual, whether employee, officer or direc-
tor. It is therefore arguable that if a Canadian citizen is the senior
person involved in the day-to-day running of the business owned
by a corporation, the business becomes a Canadian business re-
gardless of where the corporation was incorporated. Indeed it does
not even seem necessary for there to be an establishment if a Cana-
dian individual is in charge of the day-to-day management of any
business carried on in Canada.88
15 The definition subsection is s. 3(l).
86 See text at footnote 42, supra.
S7 I suppose it may be argued that under the organic theory of corporate behaviour, in which a
mind is imputed to the corporation from the person who directs it, a Court might take a dif-
ferent view. The organic theory has been accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada in B.C.
Telephone Company v. Marpole Towing Company (1970), 17 D.L.R. (3d) 545, [1971] S.C.R.
321.
88 By substituting definitions and deleting unnecessary words the statute literally reads: A Cana-
dian business means a business carried on in Canada by any number of individuals or corpora-
tions if any one or more of those comprising that number are Canadian citizens or individuals
ordinarily resident in Canada who alone or in concert with other Canadians control or are in a
position to control the conduct of the business. It may be that a Court intent on broadening the
scope of the review process would read these words very widely. As the conduct of any size-
able Canadian business on a day-to-day basis, is almost certainly run by somebody who is resi-
dent in Canada, this subparagraph of the definition could become of pervasive importance.
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But the above three points avoid the more fundamental point of
defining a "business". The statute has the type of definition which is
familiar to tax lawyers but is not a definition at all. It says that business
"includes any undertaking or enterprise carried on in anticipation of
profit". While knowledgeable people have opined that this definition
is so wide that it catches almost every conceivable real estate transac-
tion, 89 there is one limiting factor, namely the words "carried on".
These words occur not only in the definition of business but also in the
definitions of Canadian business and Canadian branch business. Ac-
cordingly, there can be no Canadian business enterprise unless a busi-
ness is being carried on. This may be a very important distinction if the
cases under the Income Tax Act are relied upon. The definition in that
statute of the word "business" includes "an adventure or concern in
the nature of trade". 90 In the Tara Exploration9 1 case, Chief Justice
Jackett, who was then the President of the Exchequer Court, decided
that the better view was that the words "carried on" are not words that
can aptly be used with the words "an adventure", because carrying on
something involves continuity of time or operations. Thus one who
ventures into the taxation precedents to define "business" must be
careful to choose cases which are not primarily concerned with the dis-
tinction between capital gains and income, and to concentrate on cases
separating business income from property income.92
Turning more specifically to the concept of "business" itself there
are two separate questions. The first is whether the activities carried on
by a person or group of persons are of such a character as to be capable
19 See the submission of the Canadian Institute of Public Real Estate Companies, Minutes of Pro-
ceedings of the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs (1973) Issue 42,
Appendix P, p. 285.
90 Income Tax Act, s. 248:
91 Tara Exploration and Development Co. Ltd. v. M.N.R., 70 D.T.C. 6370, 6376. The case was
affirmed on other grounds in the Supreme Court of Canada, 72 D.T.C. 6288.
92 There is no paucity of tax precedents even so, see Ginsberg v. M.N.R., 53 D.T.C. 445 (Tax A.
B.); Rubinstein v. M.N.R., 1962 D.T.C. 100, (Tax A.B.); Martin v. M.N.R. (1948), 3
D.T.C. 1199 (Exch. Ct.); Walsh and Micay, 65 D.T.C. 5293 (Exch. Ct.). A good article on
the cases under the old Income Tax Act is Karp, "Rental Income: Property or Business?", 16
Can. Tax J. 191 (1968). The other area where "carrying on business" is a familiar test to cor-
porate lawyers is with respect to the necessity to obtain extra-provincial licences, see Weight
Watchers International, Inc. v. Weight Watchers of Ontario Ltd., [1973] I O.R. 549, 31
D.L.R. (3d) 645, 9 C.P.R. (2d) 77 (H.C.J.).
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of being called a business. 93 The second is whether all the activities
carried on by a corporation are business activities because the very na-
ture of a corporation is to be engaged in business.9 4 The first question
usually turns on whether there is a sufficient degree of activity to con-
vince a Court that a business is carried on, with factors such as a tele-
phone listing being treated as indicative of something other than
merely passive behaviour. The second question, relating to activities
of corporations in general, is really a philosophical one-should the
fact of being a corporation, by itself, indicate the existence of a busi-
ness.
9 5
Two paragraphs in s. 3(6) may have some relevance to the determi-
nation of the question of whether a specific business is a Canadian
business enterprise. One of these 9 6 states that a Canadian business
shall be deemed to be carried on in Canada even if it is carried on only
partly in Canada and partly outside. This provision appears to have
been inserted out of an abundance of caution except in cases where it is
coupled with the second provision. This second and more troublesome
provision9 7 says that a part of a business that is capable of being
carried on as a separate business is a Canadian business enterprise if
the business of which it is a part is a Canadian business enterprise.
Take the case of a large foreign corporation which has a branch
operation in Canada thus making the business a Canadian business en-
terprise. Suppose that foreign corporation decided to sell the assets of
its Swiss branch. Is the Swiss branch a Canadian business enterprise?
It is part of the over-all business of the foreign corporation, the Cana-
dian branch of which is a Canadian business enterprise. If the statute
13 In this area the various texts on partnerships such as Underhill and Lindley are helpful. The
statutes (see for example the Partnership Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 339 s. 2) define a partnership as
the relation that subsists between persons carrying on a business in common with a view to
profit. Business is in turn defined as a trade, occupation or profession. Thus a partnership has
the concepts of "carrying on" and "in anticipation of profit" which are both included in the
definition under the Foreign Investment Review Act. See also Re Pszon, [ 1946] 2 D.L.R. 507,
[1946] OR. 229, [1946] OW.N. 280, 27 C.B.R. 130 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused
[1946] 4 D.L.R. 303, 27 C.B.R. 240, for a discussion of the elements of what constitutes a
business.
14 This argument has been put very forceably in tax cases involving Canadian controlled private
corporations, because of the small business deduction, see Farlan Investments Ltd. v. M.N.R.,
75 D.T.C. 12 (Tax Rev. Bd.); Cosmopolitan Investment Co. Ltd. v. M.N.R., 74 D.T.C. 1252
(Tax Rev. Bd.). It is believed that both these decisions may be appealed.
95 In my view it should not, but that is only the view of one academic on the value choices in the
normative world. My view is consistent with the theory, long espoused in letters patent juris-
dictions, that a corporation has all the powers and capacities of a natural person, including the
capacity, I suggest, to be doing something which is not a business.
96 Para. (f).
97 Para. (g).
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says that the sale of the Swiss branch is reviewable then the statute has
a very broad reach indeed. The example is too ridiculous to take
seriously. Is it so ridiculous, however, to contemplate that a large
Canadian-based multi-national enterprise should be required to seek
review before selling off its foreign branch operations to foreign inter-
ests and thus, perhaps, diminishing Canadian exports? If the issue
arose in the latter context it is not inconceivable that the government
might seek to review the transaction. If so then the first example
follows logically from the same statutory paragraph. 98
Another provision,99 inserted to deal with land acquisitions, has
been discussed above in another context. That paragraph indicates that
improving real property for personal use and enjoyment of the owner
or holding the property without improving it (but making the necessary
maintenance expenditures to keep it in repair) is not carrying on a busi-
ness. It is doubtful if this provision limits the width of the "business"
definition significantly. Indeed if a Court started down the logic-path
that is based on the concept that the expression of one exception
precludes others, the provision might well turn out to broaden the
meaning attributed to the word "business". The only provision in the
statute that clearly does narrow its application is found in. s. 5 which
provides that the statute does not apply to acquisitions where the gross
assets of the target have a value below $250,000 and the gross revenue
for the last fiscal year was less than $3,000,000.100 But even these
limitations are circumscribed for, in determining gross assets and reve-
nues, one must take into account businesses associated with the target
and, for new entrants into Canada, the minimum limits fall to zero on
second proclamation. 101
98 The paragraph was presumably inserted to plug the large hole left in the definition of "acquisi-
tion of control" which requires that an acquisition, in order to be an acquisition of control,
must be an acquisition of substantially all the assets of the target business. It is suggested that
the draftsman has plugged the hole in a peculiar way with rather remarkable results, an occur-
rence which is all too familiar to tax practitioners attuned to the niceties of designated surplus.
99 S. 3(9).
'00 The gross asset and gross revenue tests are further adumbrated in s. 4 of the Regulations,
SOR/74-154.
'01 See s. 31(3). The $250,000 limit is far too low for the full Canadian Cabinet to spend its time
debating the merits of a proposed acquisition. This limit likely derives from the information
set out in the Gray Report, pp. 474 et seq. There it was estimated that there were 88 takeovers
in 1968 and 85 in 1969 at a threshhold of $250,000. But inflation has changed the value of the
dollar somewhat since 1969 and the review process was never envisaged as including a Cabi-
net decision by the Gray Report.
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5. Exit the Lawyers: Significant Benefit to Canada
If the Foreign Investment Review Act applies to an acquisition, then
the acquirer must seek to have the Cabinet allow the acquisition.
Procedurally this is started by filing a notice with the Agency. Substan-
tively the Cabinet is required by the statute' 02 to allow the investment
if it concludes, "having regard to the factors enumerated in subsection
2(2)", that the investment is likely to be of significant benefit to
Canada. The words "having regard to" would seem to preclude the
Cabinet' 0 3 from allowing considerations other than those set out in
s. 2(2) to influence its choice.104 This makes subsec. (2) of crucial im-
portance. That subsection set out five criteria, which are the exclusive
ingredients in "significant benefit to Canada", as follows:
(1) The effect of the acquisition on the level and nature of economic
activity in Canada, including, without limiting the generality of
the foregoing, the effect on employment, on resource processing,
on the utilization of parts, components and services produced in
Canada, and on exports from Canada.10 5
(2) The degree and significance of participation in the business en-
terprise or new businesst 0 6 and in any industry in Canada of which
the business enterprise or new business forms a part. 107
(3) The effect of the acquisition on productivity, industrial efficiency,
technological development, product innovation and product vari-
ety in Canada. 10 8
102 S. 12(l). As to the possibility of mandamus lying against the Cabinet, the question is open to
some doubt but the trend may be in that direction, see Note 89 L.Q.R. 329 and the cases cited
therein.
l13 Technically it is not the Cabinet but the Governor in Council who makes the decision. Section
28 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-23, defines the Governor in Council to be the
Governor General of Canada acting by and with the advice of the Queen's Privy Council for
Canada. The Queen's Privy Council for Canada was established pursuant to s. II of the Brit-
ish North America Act, 1867, (U.K.), c. 3. Technically, under s. 9 of the British North
America Act the Executive Government of Canada rests with the Queen.
104 The only reason one might doubt this is the difference in wording in s. 10 relating to the
Minister's opinion. Surely the Cabinet has as wide a scope for its conclusion as the Minister
does for his opinion.
105 As the Bill was originally drafted only the level of economic activity and employment were
mentioned in this paragraph. These two factors appear to be a direct copy from the Gray
Report, p. 457. The additions, which are consistent with the Gray Report, may be attributable
to the position taken by the New Democratic Party, see the speech by David Lewis, Hansard
(1973), 1st Sess. 29th Parliament, Vol. III, p. 2862.
106 "New business" is a defined term meaning a business not previously carried on in Canada by
the person in relation to which the expression is relevant. Thus it appears that Canadian partic-
ipation in both the acquirer and the target are relevant considerations.
107 This factor is suggested as one factor that might be taken into account by the Review Agency
at p. 456 of the Gray Report.
1 These factors are all set out on pp. 455 and 456 of the Gray Report.
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(4) The effect of the acquisition on competition. 109
(5) The compatibility of the acquisition with national industrial and
economic policies, taking into consideration industrial and eco-
nomic policy objectives enunciated by the government of any
province likely to be significantly affected 11 0 by the acqusition. 1 1
As all these criteria are directly derived from the Gray Report, it is
likely a fair inference that the approach to the review procedure there
set out will be, in general, the approach adopted by the Agency, the
Minister and the Cabinet. The one guideline not set out in the legisla-
tion which was specifically suggested in the Gray Report is the geo-
graphic location of the target business. It is likely that this could be
properly taken into account by any reviewing authority under the gen-
eral words in criteria (1) and (5). 112
The specific reference to provincial policies within a federal statute
is an interesting example of what may ultimately be a closer working
relationship in the economic sphere between the provincial and federal
governments. 113 It is also a source of some problems administratively.
Because of the 60-day deemed allowance provision' 1 4 it may be dif-
ficult to consult with several provinces as well as proceeding through
109 Again see the Gray Report p. 457 and at p. 464 with reference to the relationship between the
Agency and the Restrictive Trade Practices Tribunal. It is usually possible to argue that com-
petition will be enhanced by a takeover if the acquirer is not already in the Canadian market.
The introduction of a more economically viable entity is usually considered to have a positive
impact on competition. Also the revitalization of a failing company can be argued to be
beneficial to competition. It is interesting to speculate what happens if government policy
does not encourage competition any more. In a speech in the House of Commons on Febru-
ary 6, 1975, the Minister of Energy, Donald Macdonald suggested that there was going to be
a change "from a society founded on competition to one based more on sharing and compas-
sion", House of Commons Debates (1975) Vol. 119, p. 2991.
110 The Report of the Select Committee on Economic and Cultural Nationalism has considered
the impact of these words and recommended that Ontario require all the material now required
to be filed federally to also be filed provincially by any non-eligible person acquiring control
of a business enterprise carrying on business in Ontario.
ll See the Gray Report, p. 456 and, with respect to provincial inputs, pp. 437 et seq.
112 New Brunswick has been very energetically suggesting that foreign investment or any other
investment should be welcomed to that region of the country, as Mr. Hatfield has repeatedly
been quoted in the press as saying, particularly with respect to the Bricklin car. Mr. Hatfield's
brief to the Commons Committee was very clear. See Standing Committee on Finance, Trade
and Economic Affairs (1973) Issue 42, Appendix 14, p. 4:
The Government of New Brunswick's opinion on the proposed legislation is a simple and
straightforward one-we see no need for it in our region of Canada and we believe that it
would prove to be harmful to our attempts to attract and to accelerate industrial develop-
ment.
113 A parallel in the opposite direction might be seen in the Business Corporations Act, R.S.O.
1970, c. 53 where s. 130(3) amended 1974, c. 26, s. 3, requires a majority of directors'
meetings to be held in Canada rather than in Ontario.
114 S. 13.
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three or four steps at the federal level. 115 Yet provincial governments
may demand consultation. 1 16 If the target enterprise in question does
business in all the provinces of Canada then each province might feel
significantly affected by the proposed acquisition. Exacerbating this
situation is the problem of when a policy is "enunciated" by a provin-
cial government. If the federal authorities could rely on the concept
that only publicly stated provincial policies needed to be considered,
the job would be considerably simpler. But it would appear that
"enunciated" is used in the sense of being stated precisely rather than
stated publicly as specific representations from provinces significantly
affected are envisaged in the statute. 1 17
It is very difficult to give any guidance to potential applicants as to
the weighting of various factors which might be considered to be of
significant benefit to Canada. The most useful source of information
would be a statement of reasons for both positive and negative
decisions by the Cabinet. So far all that has emerged are press releases
accompanying announcements that acquisitions have been refused or
allowed.11 8 Until March 3, 1975 these had all been couched in general
terms. The March 3rd press release set out ten components relevant to
the determination of significant benefit, without giving any weighting
to any of them although compatibility with industrial and economic
policies was found to exist in each takeover allowed. The "benefits"
which now appear to be of predominant importance are: 119
(1) Employment effects. Increased employment has been mentioned
in most of the press releases. 120 The interest is not only in an
"5 As well as the Agency and the Minister, a committee of Cabinet considers each application
before it is submitted to the full Cabinet.
116 Ontario seems to be the most demanding, if the approach of the Report of the Select Commit-
tee on Economic and Cultural Nationalism (Toronto, 1975) is any indication. Hayden and
Bums suggest, 3-3, that the Quebec government successfully pressured the federal govern-
ment to revise the Bluebird-Corbeil decision.
117 Sees. 9(d)and s. 11(3).
1 Press Release of August 9, 1974 regarding the Brunswick Ozite merger; Press Release of Sep-
tember 11, 1974 regarding the acquisition of previously Dutch-controlled Mulder (Canada)
Limited by the British controlled Blackwood Hodge Group; Press Release of December 23,
1974 relating to 14 applications. In the December press release Mr. Gillespie indicated that
full disclosure on a case-by-case basis might be unfair. In the latest press release of March 3,
1975 there are some 14 allowed acquisitions and one disallowed. With respect to those
allowed there is, in some cases, fairly detailed statements of the benefits to Canada. Attached
to the release as an appendix is a table setting forth categories of significant benefit across the
top and the acquisitions down the side. Then an -X' is placed in the column where signifi-
cant benefit was shown. Press releases since March 3, 1975 have followed the same pattern.
119 See also Hayden and Burns, 7037 et seq.; Langford, Canadian Foreign Investment Controls,
(CCH 1974, Toronto) pp. 19et seq.
120 The employment effects are required information to be submitted with the notice of proposed
acquisition, see Regulations SOR/74-154. Schedule IV, items 2(e), (o) and (q).
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increased number of jobs but increased participation by Canadians
in the senior managerial positions. 121
(2) Projected plant expansion or modernization. This usually goes
hand-in-hand with product rationalization or improved efficiency
if the acquisition is horizontal. If the target company is on the
verge of insolvency then the preservation of the existing plant and
the existing employment would be considered a benefit in itself.1 22
Otherwise new investment is probably required. 1 2 3
(3) Procurement of more Canadian goods and services or increased
processing in Canada than existed under the previous manage-
ment. 1 2
4
(4) Increased participation by Canadians as shareholders and direc-
tors. 12 5 In the only reasons given in 1974 for a disallowance, the
Minister said that a proposed takeover by Celanese Canada Ltd' of
Westmills Carpets Ltd. was rejected because the government felt
the target company should be able to continue and develop as a
successful independent Canadian business enterprise. Celanese
Canada publicly announced that the takeover would have resulted
in 200 new jobs, vastly expanded plant, increased Canadian own-
ership, increased exports and expanded research and develop-
ment. 1 26 It would appear that the increased Canadian ownership
was in an over-all sense rather than in a control sense. Thus loss of
Canadian control of the target has apparently been weighted very
heavily in the scales. If the transfer of control had been from one
foreigner to another with no effect on Canadian control either
presently or prospectively, the benefits Celanese proposed might
well have been considered significant. This is an interesting ex-
ample of when the weighting afforded to the various beneficial ele-
ments might be changed depending on the type of transaction
subject to review.
(5) Increased exports from Canada. It is obviously possible for multi-
121 Gray Report, p. 455. See March 3rd press release relating to the Redstar acquisition of Mar-
coux Transit.
122 See Gray Report, p. 455 and Regulations SOR/75-154 Schedule IV, item 2(d).
123 Indeed improved productivity and industrial efficiency have been a major factor in most of the
allowances announced.
124 Again the Regulations Schedule IV, item 2(g) and the Gray Report, p. 455 place emphasis on
these factors.
125 Legislative changes in the incorporating statutes have forced corporations to have a majority
of Canadians on their boards of directors, see for example, the Business Corporations Act,
R.S.O. 1970, c. 53, s. 122(3). Accordingly, it is hardly a benefit to Canada arising as a result
of the acquisition that there are now a majority of Canadians on the board.
126 See Hayden and Bums, 3-3 and 3-4.
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national enterprises to allocate export markets amongst sub-
sidiaries. It is widely assumed that this is likely to act against Can-
adian interests as Canadian exports may be curtailed if the
Canadian subsidiary is not given export opportunities. 127 On the
other hand the available data is very inconclusive. Some foreign
controlled enterprises in Canada may have a disproportionately
large share of the total export market for their group because they
have been allocated it by the controlling parent. Still, on a case-by-
case basis, it is realistic to expect the Canadian authorities to press
at least for no diminution of exports. This is most likely to arise as
a serious problem when a foreign government nationalizes a given
industry, such as the British Aircraft Industry, which has Canadian
subsidiaries. It is difficult to see why the foreign government
would wish to increase Canadian exports. It may be that exports
are a less important "benefit" than the others listed because they
are susceptible to changes in foreign laws and other pressures over
which neither the Canadian authorities nor the non-eligible
acquirer have any control. 128
(6) The location of additional research and development facilities in
Canada. 12 9 This has a fairly high priority and is one area where the
potential acquirer may be able to show benefits rather easily
because the target may have done little or no research and develop-
ment in Canada. The existence of various government assistance
programs may make the introduction of research and development
less costly than almost any other benefit. 130
The list of six items, though far from exhaustive, 131 could be
viewed as the major benefit items. The real trouble is that the signifi-
cance of the benefit is the controlling test. There is no indication in the
statute what "significant" means nor is it meant, I suggest, to be a
concept amenable to legal analysis. It is meant to be a judgment call on
127 There is a long discussion of the effects of foreign control on the export performance of sub-
sidiaries in Canada in the Gray Report, Chapter 10. See also Hayden and Burns, 7052.
128 Thus, for example, only four of the March 3rd allowances showed increased exports as a
benefit that was obtained.
129 See the Gray Report, pp. 133 et seq.
130 Some of the government grant and loan programs are discussed in the Gray Report, pp. 349 et
seq. The government of the United States, often under the guise of defence expenditures, has
spent huge sums on research and development. The government initiative in this area is gener-
ally recognized as the key factor, see our example, Servan-Schreiber, The American
Challenge (1968, New York), pp. 141 etseq.
131 Not included in my list of six is the impact on competition, which I mentioned earlier and a
heading in the press releases entitled "Improved Product Variety and Innovation". It will be
interesting to see if future press releases add more categories.
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a case-by-case basis. While a "non-detriment" approach has been
suggested 132 as being more apposite in cases where any real benefit is
unlikely to occur, such as in corporate reorganizations undertaken for
tax purposes, that is not the approach in the statute. But the reviewing
authorities clearly would anticipate that less benefits could rationally
be expected in such cases. 133 For example, if an American parent had
majority share control of one Canadian subsidiary and had another
wholly-owned Canadian subsidiary, then the transfer of the shares of
the wholly-owned subsidiary to the controlled subsidiary would pre-
sumably be a reviewable transaction. But, it is suggested, less
"benefit" would be demanded by the authorities before allowing the
transaction than would be demanded if the wholly-owned subsidiary
was being transferred to a new U.K. parent.
The statute envisages that the acquirer may give undertakings to the
Queen in right of Canada conditional upon the allowance of the
proposed acquisitions. These undertakings are demanded by the
Agency to ensure that the proposed significant benefit is something
more than brutumfulmen. Thus the acquirer in his notice sets forth his
proposals for the future of the target enterprise, 134 negotiates with the
Agency as to the acceptability of the proposals1 35 and signs undertak-
ings embodying at least some of the results of the negotiations. These
undertakings are made specifically enforceable by Court applica-
tion 13 6although the Minister has indicated that further negotiations
would be a preferred route. 137 Except in the preparation of the under-
takings, lawyers are not involved by the Agency in the process for de-
termining significant benefit to Canada. 138
132 See, for example, the interchange between Senator Connolly and Mr. Macdonald, (1973)
Proceedings of The Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, 23: 10.
133 In the press releases so far produced, some allowances seem to have had benefits in only three
or four of the ten listed categories while others had benefits in all ten.
134 That is what Schedule IV of the regulation is essentially concerned with.
3-5 It is a tactical question whether the acquirer might hold back a bit in filling out the forms
so he could have something to give to the Agency at the negotiation stage. Naturally the
Agency likes to feel that it had a role in extracting more significant benefit for Canada.
136 Sees. 21.
'37 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Eco-
nomic Affairs (1973) Issue 26, p. 16. It is still too early to tell whether the enforcement of
these undertakings will be vigorously pursued. Undertakings given on acquisitions allowed
can be published under s. 14(4)(c).
138 This is not to say someone with legal training is precluded, but the statute does not suggest a
legal definition of significant nor would wrangling over some standard likely accelerate the
review process.
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6. Administration and Enforcement
The Agency is headed by a Commissioner 139 and is divided into
three branches: Compliance Branch, Assessment Branch, and Re-
search and Analysis Branch. When a notice is received by the Agency,
the Rulings Division of the Compliance Branch makes an initial review
to see that the notice conforms to the requirements set forth in the regu-
lations. 140 Once the notice is complete a certificate signed by the Com-
missioner is sent out setting forth the date of receipt of the notice. 14 1
Then the file is transferred to the Assessment Branch which is
responsible for negotiating undertakings and for advising the Minister
as to whether the acquisition meets the significant benefit to Canada
test. Provincial inputs are obtained by the Agency at this stage from the
provinces affected. Under the statutory wording the Agency is to send
all the material to the Minister and, if he feels he has sufficient infor-
mation to allow the investment, he is obliged to so recommend to the
Cabinet. 14 2 But s. 11 envisages that at any time during the assessment
process the Minister may decide he will be either unable to complete
the assessment 143 or unable to make a positive recommendation to the
Cabinet. In such a situation the Minister is then required to cause the
Agency to send a notice to the applicant advising him of his right to
make further representations. This notice stops the running of the 60-
day time period for a deemed allowance. 144 The notice gives the
applicant 30 days to notify the Agency of a desire to make further rep-
resentations. If no further representations are forthcoming then the
Minister completes his assessment and sends to the Cabinet a summary
of the material filed (except written undertakings and provincial sub-
missions which are sent up in full). 145
In the more usual case negotiations simply continue with the Agency
although the parties have the right to make further representations in a
more formal way. If the parties so desire, the Agency is required to no-
139 Under s. 7(2) the Governor in Council appoints the Commissioner. In fact there is now a
Commissioner and a Deputy commissioner.
140 It usually does not, so the applicant is sent a deficiency letter.
141 S. 8(4).
142 S. 10.
143 These important words in s. I I(I) make it proper for the Minister to stop the clock. If the 60-
day time period is insufficient, the sending of the notice is not a mere device; it was intended
for that purpose.
144 S. 13(l)(c).
145 It is peculiar hut only under s. 11(2) are the provincial representations and the applicant's un-
dertakings required to be submitted in full by the Minister. There is no requirement for a rec-
ommendation by the Minister under this subsection although his opinion is presumably sent
forward to Cabinet.
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tify the Minister who is required to offer the parties a reasonable op-
portunity either in person or through counsel to make further
representations. 146 Eventually the process of negotiation 147 comes to a
halt and the Minister sends to Cabinet a summary of all the material
together with his recommendation. The ultimate decision is made by
the Cabinet which either allows or refuses to allow the proposed
acquisition. 148 A copy of the order made by the Cabinet is sent to the
applicant and published in Part I of the Canada Gazette. 149
In the event that a non-eligible acquirer of a Canadian business en-
terprise does not file the notice required under s. 8(1) the Minister has
two remedies available. Either he may demand that the acquirer file a
notice with the Agency1 50 or he may apply for an injunction to a sup-
erior Court. 151 If a demand is served by the Minister and the acquirer
does not respond, then the Minister has three choices:
(1) He can launch an investigation. 152
(2) He can apply to a superior Court to render the investment nuga-
tory. 153
(3) He can proceed through the appropriate channels to have the
146 S. 11(3). While it appears that the Minister must personally decide who should hear the repre-
sentations in view of the statutory wording, it is suggested that the Minister is not required to
hear the representations himself, see Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-23, s. 23(2) as
amended by the Statutory Instruments Act, 1970-71-72, c. 38, s. 28.
147 I should note that writers who have had some experience with making applications to and
negotiating with the Agency have been very laudatory to the Agency personnel. See for ex-
ample, Hayden and Bums; Amett in a paper delivered in Toronto in September 1974 entitled
"The Foreign Investment Review Act after Six Months".
148 S. 12(l). It should be noted that Cabinet can refer the matter back for a s. I I(I) notice if that
has not already occurred, s. 12(2).
149 There appears to be no requirement for publication although a deemed allowance must be reg-
istered with the Clerk of the Privy Council under s. 13(2). The Statutory Instruments Act,
1970-71-72, c. 38, s. 24, provides that any person can inspect any statutory instrument that
has been registered. Why a different treatment was accorded in the statute for the deemed al-
lowance from a Cabinet decision to allow is not clear. It seems that the Minister assumed
publication in the Canada Gazette was mandatory, see Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
of The Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs (1973), Issue 42, p. 36.
150 The demand must be by registered mail or personal service and must indicate that nature of
the proceedings which could follow if the demand is ignored, s. 8(3) and (3. 1).
151 S. 19. The injunction may be ex parte if time constraints force such a result, otherwise it is on
at least 48 hours' notice to the party sought to be enjoined.
152 The powers on an investigation, which are set out in ss. 15-18, are quite extensive. Presum-
ably the investigation would be carried out by the Compliance Branch of the Agency with ap-
propriate help from the Department of Justice.
153 This drastic remedy is fully described in s. 20. The possibilities include an order by the Court
requiring the acquirer to dispose of the shares or assets. In the case of a foreign acquirer the
Court may vest the shares or assets in a trustee, have the trustee sell them and remit the
proceeds, after paying the trustees' fees, to the foreign acquirer.
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acquirer charged with a summary conviction offence for failure to
obey the demand. 5 4
With this arsenal of remedies available to the Minister it would be a
courageous acquirer indeed who did not attempt to keep on side with
the Agency.
There is, of course, the availability of a Ministerial opinion as to
whether or not an acquirer is a non-eligible person. That opinion is not
likely subject to review by the Federal Court.' 5 5 Accordingly, if the
potential acquirer cannot convince the Minister to issue a favourable
eligibility opinion, he may have little or no recourse. If he goes
through with a proposed acquisition after the Minister has refused to
give him an opinion, a demand under s. 8(3) is presumably a foregone
conclusion. If he bows to the demand he has conceded the Minister's
point. If he does not, he is guilty of a criminal offence. He may be able
to challenge the propriety of the issuance by the Minister of the
demand notice in the Federal Court. 1 5 6 If the Court accepts jurisdiction
it could issue an order restraining the Minister from proceeding further
under the statute, i.e., from proceeding with the criminal prosecution.
But that is a pretty circuitous route to a businessman. These provisions
may be one indication that the statute was not intended to be a lawyer's
delight. The Agency not the Court was intended to be, and in practice
is, the focal point of action.
The Agency also has the job of enforcing the undertakings given on
acquisitions which are allowed. Again this will be undertaken by the
154 S. 24(2). Note that this subsection is devastating in that, if the acquirer believes it is not a
non-eligible person, it is still guilty of an offence if the Minister has served a notice under
s. 8(3) and the acquirer does not file. Directors and officers are liable also under s. 27.
1-1 Stikeman in his article "Foreign Investment Review: Canada's New Medicine", The Busi-
ness Quarterly (Autumn 1974) p. 77 states that in such a case an investor may apply to the
Federal Court for leave to obtain a declaratory order. Presumably this is pursuant to s. 18 of
the Federal Court Act. Chief Justice Jackett in his book on The Federal Court of Canada, A
Manual of Practice (1971, Ottawa) suggests on p. 18 that s. 18 does not create a new kind of
proceeding. It is not a usual proceeding for a Court to review a ministerial opinion. On the
other hand the Court might, in its discretion, grant a declaratory order, on the application of
an affected party, construing the meaning of the words of the statute. The locus standi of the
applicant may be in doubt but the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Thorson v. A. -
G. Can. (No. 2) (1974), 43 D.L.R. (3d) 1, [1975] I S.C.R. 138, 1 N.R. 225, gives the liti-
gant some hope.
116 In a presentation before the Senate Committee, Mr. Fred Gibson of the Department of Justice
stated that s. 18 of the Federal Court Act could be used by an acquirer to seek a declaration
that the Minister lacked authority to issue a notice under s. 8(3) and to restrain the Minister
from proceeding further under the provisions of the Bill, see Proceedings of the Standing
Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce (1973), 23:17. Mr. Gibson seems to indicate
in the same passage that a direct review of a Ministerial opinion under s. 4(l) would not be
possible. Mr. Gillespie indicated he would seek an amendment to the statute if the review
process proved to be inadequate.
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Compliance Branch. While the statute has provision 157 for Court en-
forcement, it is much more likely that further negotiations will ensue.
It would not be surprising to find the Assessment Branch heard from at
this point as well, as it negotiated the original undertakings.
The third branch of the Agency, Research and Analysis, is respon-
sible for long range research into what constitutes significant benefit to
Canada on an industry-by-industry and province-by-province basis.1 5
Personnel from this branch will have the major input into the develop-
ment of policies that are ultimately issued as guidelines. The Branch is
also responsible for the preparation of the annual report.
7. Some Problem Areas
The above analysis is little more than an overview of the statute. It
should demonstrate that the Foreign Investment Review Act is very
technically drafted, particularly throughout s. 3. On the other hand,
there are sweeping provisions, such as s. 2, where the applicant is left
with little guidance. These two polar extremes cause many problems
for the Agency and for applicants. By considering a few typical
problem areas the nature of these difficulties can be appreciated.
(1) Corporate reorganizations
A reorganization within a corporate group where there is no change
in the ultimate control of the group may or may not be subject to
review. If the* reorganization takes place by way of amalgamation there
is a specific statutory exception that makes the transaction not subject
to review.1 5 9 But if the two corporations which it is desired to combine
are not within the same incorporating jurisdiction, amalgamation in the
statutory sense may be impossible. For example, a parent owning two
subsidiaries may seek to sell the shares it owns in one subsidiary to the
other subsidiary or to sell the assets of one subsidiary to another sub-
sidiary. If all three corporations (the parent and two Canadian incorpo-
rated subsidiaries) are non-eligible then the acquisition of control by
one subsidiary of the other technically will be a reviewable transac-
tion. 160 Yet the Canadian business enterprise has not changed nor has
157 S. 21.
158 Hayden and Bums, 30,004.
159 Section 3(3)(e) and see the brief of the Canadian Bar Association, Minutes of Proceedings
and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs (1973),
Issue 42, Appendix R, pp. 469-70.
160 To trace the language through in the case of a share sale the sister company has acquired more
than 50 per cent of the voting shares of the target company. Thus it has acquired control under
s. 3(3)(d) unless "the person or group of persons acquiring the shares had, at the time of the
acquisition, control in fact". Now the only acquiring corporation is the sister corporation and
it had no previous control at all.
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the ultimate control really changed. 161 In such a case the Agency or the
Minister might agree that this is not the type of situation where a full
Cabinet review is appropriate. What alternative courses of action are
available to the authorities to implement that decision?
The Agency could demand that a notice be filed and then pass the
matter on to Cabinet with a suggestion that a "no detriment" view of
significant benefit would be appropriate. This would still involve put-
ting the matter before Cabinet, a body whose responsibilities are heavy
enough without adding to them unnecessarily. Alternatively Cabinet
might instruct the Agency to just sit on the notices for 60 days thus
bringing into play the deemed allowance provisions. This is inap-
propriate as the deemed allowance was designed to be a fail-safe
mechanism, not a method of handling awkward disputes. 162 In addi-
tion, it would put the applicant to the unnecessary expense of filing a
detailed notice which was never intended to be used. Alternatively
again, the Agency might write a letter to the applicant saying that, in
its opinion, the matter was not one that was appropriate to review
within the spirit of the statute. Such letters have been written but it is
doubtful if they are of any binding effect. 163 This may not be too im-
portant if in practice the letters are treated as binding on the Minis-
ter.' 64 It has the advantage of permitting the Agency to cut down the
amount of material that needs to be filed in any particular case before
the letter is sent out as no notice is officially acknowledged. 165 As a
final alternative the Minister might issue guidelines under s. 4(2). That
subsection provides that guidelines may be issued with respect to the
application and administration of any provision of the Act. Whether
161 This is one of the examples Macdonald was concerned about when he appeared before the
Senate Committee, see Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Com-
merce (1973), Issue 23, pp. 7 et seq. Since this article was written the Minister has issued
guidelines on corporate reorganization in an attempt to rationalize the impact of the statute.
The various alternatives for administrative action are still true.
162 See the exchange between Mr. Gillespie and Mr. Stevens, Minutes of Proceedings of the
Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Commerce (1973), Issue 23, p. 33.
1s See De Galindez v. King (1906), 15 Que. K.B. 320, affd 39 S.C.R. 682; Salter v. M.N.R.,
52 D.T.C. 148, 6 Tax A.B.C. 193; McClyment v. M.N.R., 68 D.T.C. 715; Kennedy v.
M.N.R., [1929] Ex. C.R. 36.
164 After many years of sticking to the position that no binding opinions could be given, the
Department of National Revenue decided in 1970 to issue advance rulings in respect to defi-
nite transactions which rulings are "binding upon the Department as long as the law as consti-
tuted at the time the ruling is given remains unchanged", Information Circular 70-6. Until
1974 the rulings were not published but became known by the tax grapevine. In 1974 the
department decided to publish the rulings after taking out the names of the parties in order to
preserve confidentiality.
165 A certificate of receipt is required to be issued under s. 8(4) if a complete notice is filed. The
certificate date marks the start of the 60-day automatic allowance provision of s. 13.
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such guidelines can properly cut down on the reach of the statute as a
matter of pure law is open to debate. 16 6 As a practical matter they
could be made as binding on the Minister as the advance rulings under
the Income Tax Act and could be published. 
167
(2) Real estate acquisitions
Real estate investment and development is obviously different from
manufacturing and processing. Yet the legislative definition of signifi-
cant benefit is essentially derived from the Gray Report which
regarded the suggested guidelines as applicable mainly to the manufac-
turing and resource industries.' 68 But the statute is not drafted that
way. Instead an attempt has been made to preclude some real estate
acquisitions from the reach of the statute. Thus in s. 3(9) it is
specifically provided that the holding of real estate and the expenditure
of funds to maintain it in the condition in which it was acquired is not,
for these reasons alone, carrying on a business. Accordingly, the
acquisition of such real estate would not be the acquisition of control of
a Canadian business enterprise. As the Bill went through the House
and Senate a large number of criticisms were levelled at the provisions
in so far as they affected real estate. 169 The result was that the Minister
166 It is submitted that a Minister with the power to issue guidelines should be able to fill out the
vagaries of the Act in a way consistent with its over-all design and be bound by his own
guidelines. The authority to issue guidelines even in the absence of the statutory provision is
clear, see R. v. Port of London Authority, exp. Kynoch Ltd., [1919] I K.B. 176 which has
been followed in Canada in Re Hopedale Developments Ltd. and Town of Oakville (1964), 47
D.L.R. (2d) 482, [1965] 1 O.R. 259 (C.A.) and in Re North Coast Air Services Ltd. and Air
Transport Committee of the Canadian Transport Comm'n (1972), 32 D.L.R. (3d) 695,
[1972] F.C. 390 sub nom. Re North Coast Services Ltd. But such guidelines are treated in
those cases as not having any binding effect in the sense of fettering the Minister's discretion.
There is a suggestion, however, in more recent cases that the law is changing to say that not
only may administrative authorities issue guidelines but they may, at least somewhat, fetter
their discretion by so doing, see British Oxygen Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Technology, [ 1970] 3
All E.R. 165 (H.L.) which was followed in Cummings v. Birkenhead Corp., [1971] 2 All
E.R. 88 1, see also Lever (Finance) Ltd. v. Westminister Corp., [ 1970] 3 All E.R. 496, Com-
ment, 34 Mod. L.R. 335 (1971). In a Tax Review Board decision it has been held that the
Minister is bound by an Interpretation Bulletin where a taxpayer has relied on it, Bowen v.
M.N.R., 72 D.T.C. 1161, which is believed to be under appeal. This concept of reliance by a
person affected being relevant to any change in the interpretation of the law was the basis of
Cardozo's famous opinion in Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287
U.S. 358 affirming 7 P. 2d 927 (Montana S.C.), see Comments 25 Va. L. Rev. 210 (1938),
60 Harv. L.R. 437 (1947).
167 The fact that guidelines are given a specific statutory foundation in the Foreign Investment
Review Act should support their validity as a form of delegated legislative power.
166 Gray Report, at p. 456, footnote I.
169 See the various briefs in the Appendices to the Minutes of Proceedings of the Standing Com-
mittee on Banking, Trade and Connerce (1973) Issue 42.
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promised that he would publish guidelines under s. 4(2) concerning
the application of the Act to real estate. 170
These guidelines were tabled by the Minister in the House of Com-
mons on March 22, 1974. In the preamble to the guidelines it is
specifically stated that the guidelines do not have the force of law but
are designed to serve as a guide to the manner in which certain
provisions of the statute are to be administered. The guidelines are said
to identify factors which may indicate whether or not a person acquir-
ing control of real estate is acquiring control of a Canadian business
enterprise.
The two major factors set out in the guidelines are:
(1) The nature of the property in the sense that if it is a "business
property" as opposed to a "circulating asset" the acquisition will
be reviewable. The guidelines then set out several categories of
"business property" including goodwill, lists of accounts payable
and other items remote from real estate. But there is a sub-
paragraph called "rental property" which states that the activity of
earning rents on an economically or commercially significant scale
is usually a business. The subparagraph then goes on to say that if
the gross value of the property exceeds $10 million then the activ-
ity is deemed to be economically or commercially significant.
"Circulating assets" are then defined to include anything that is
not a "business property" except anything with a value over $10
million. The conclusion that this guideline suggests is that any real
estate acquisition where the value of the property exceeds $10
million isprimafacie reviewable. 171
(2) The circumstances of the transferor and the transferee. As two ex-
amples of the application of this factor, the guidelines provide
that, if the transferor is a corporation, that fact tends to mean it has
disposed of a business, but if the transferee is to put the property to
a different use from that of the transferor then that tends to mean
there is no acquisition of a business. Perhaps this part of the
guidelines is trying to deal with the question of whether the contin-
uation of the business by the acquirer is relevant to the problem of
what has been acquired. Thus if X acquired raw land from Y to
build a shopping centre, does the fact that Y previously farmed the
"70 See Proceedings of the Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce (1973)
23:28. Mr. Gillespie said he would not only issue guidelines with respect to the question of
real estate but he would also "elaborate on these guidelines". I know of no such elaboration.
171 Arnett took the same view in a paper he delivered in September 1974 entitled "The Foreign
Investment Review Act after Six Months", see footnote 147, supra.
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land make the acquisition subject to review? The answer may
depend on whether the livestock or farm equipment are also
acquired. 172 It may also depend on whether you say Y was selling
a farm or was selling a potential shopping centre site. 173 The
guideline raises the question but offers no solution.
The real estate guidelines end up with two subsidiary points not nec-
essarily related to real estate. The first point is that the guidelines
dismiss as irrelevant whether employees report to work or not in char-
acterizing a given activity as a business. One would have great sym-
pathy for this position were it not for the statutory definitions of
Canadian branch business and Canadian business. 174 The second point
is that the guidelines state that the provision in s. 3(6)(g) relating to the
severability of parts of a business is interpreted to mean that the sever-
ance into a separate business must have been completed before the
acquisition. This latter point could considerably cut down the reach of
the statute if applied in areas other than real estate.
While the guidelines may not be very helpful to a potential non-
eligible acquirer of real estate, it is difficult to suggest what the Min-
ister ought to do in the absence of a definite government policy as to
the advisability of foreign investment in the real estate field. To the ex-
tent that such foreign investment is by a developer who wishes to erect
homes for sale or rent to Canadians, the developer can be seen as con-
tributing to the supply of homes which may be beneficial in the major
urban areas where homes are scarce and costly. 175 On the other hand
the investment in land by foreigners merely to hold the land for future
sale without improving it 1 7 6 may withhold otherwise available land
from the market and drive up land prices even further. Meanwhile sev-
eral provinces 177 have adopted statutes designed to curtail or prohibit
foreigners from either purchasing real property or obtaining it under
172 Before the Senate Committee, Mr. Gillespie said:
If a person were to buy a farm as an operating business then technically that would be
reviewable. But if a person were to buy a farm, that is to say a piece of land and not the
business, that would not be. It would be that kind of clarity and distinction I would hope to
be able to put out in the guidelines.
173 There may be some analogy to the "pith and substance" doctrine of constitutional law.
74 The provisions have been discussed above. If the guideline is saying that these words are not
apposite and therefore will be ignored in the administration of the statute, with respect to real
estate transactions, there is much common sense to such an approach. But is it legally sound?
175 The Registered Home Ownership Savings Plan under the Income Tax Act is one government
response to the problem of home purchases. It indicates that encouraging home ownership is a
government policy.
176 Which is currently encouraged under s. 3(9).
171 P.E.I., Nova Scotia, Ontario and British Columbia.
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Crown grants. It may well be that the federal government should en-
courage foreign developers and discourage foreign investors in the real
estate area (which is exactly contrary to the way the statute is presently
written) and leave it to the provinces to ensure significant benefit
through planning legislation and other provincial statutes. 178 Until a
clear policy is developed the non-eligible persons in the real estate
business have a difficult row to hoe. 179
(3) Canadianization of non-eligible persons
Many corporations which are clearly non-eligible persons under the
statute will not be able to expand or develop without subjecting them-
selves to review. One example of this type of corporation would be a
conglomerate that specializes in purchasing failing companies with a
view to building up the management strength until the business
becomes profitable again. Another would be real estate holding com-
panies that can only expand by purchasing further properties. Other
non-eligible corporations may prefer to become "eligible" to avoid
any question of the applicability of the statute, particularly after second
proclamation. 180 The statute provides an incentive to become "elig-
ible" which has led to several attempts at compliance by avoidance. 18
In a typical case, the non-eligible person is an established business
in Canada whose largest shareholder is a foreign corporation in the
same general line of business. Initially the foreign parent 182 appointed
171 The inclusion of real property within the scope of the Foreign Investment Review Act is one
area where there may possibly be a constitutional problem. See Amett, "Canadian Regulation
of Foreign Investment: The Legal Parameters" 50 Can. Bar Rev. 213 (1972), for a perceptive
analysis of the constitutional problems in general.
179 In the December list of approvals and disapprovals there is a refusal to allow a West German
company to acquire control of the Rockhill Apartments of Montreal, no reasons being given.
It would appear that in this type of acquisition there is little significant benefit to Canada
which the acquirer can show unless the benefits derived from the proposed disposition of the
sale proceeds by the vendor are taken into consideration. In the March 3rd press release one
acquisition of an office rental business in Westmount, P.Q. was approved. The reason given
was not related to the purchaser but to the proposals of the seller as to the investment of the
proceeds.
180 While this article has not dealt with the review of the establishment of new businesses under
the statute, it is worth noting that, at least so far as corporations presently doing business
within Canada are concerned, second proclamation may not have a tremendous impact
because the related business guidelines are drawn broadly. The Gray Report stated at p. 467:
. . . because of the potential new activity and competitive stimulus of new investment, the
bias would probably be in favour of allowing new investment. Takeovers would likely be
looked at more critically.
181 1 am indebted to George Glover for bringing this phrase to my attention at a seminar given to
some political science students at the University of Toronto in November 1974. I have heard it
used often since so I am not sure of its origin.
'82 By parent I am not referring necessarily to ownership of over 50 per cent of the voting shares
but rather to the ownership of a sufficient number of shares to constitute defacto control.
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all the directors and the senior officers were drawn from personnel al-
ready in the employ of the foreign parent. As the business matured,
Canadians took over many of the senior management positions, and
Canadian residents became a majority of the members of the board of
directors. 183 Sometimes a majority of the shares were held in Canada
but if so they were widely dispersed and the foreign parent still had
voting control if it chose to exercise it. In such a case, so long as voting
control resides abroad the non-eligible status will remain. To sell the
controlling shares at the present time could be to dispose of a valuable
asset at distress prices1 84 with no guarantee that the shares would be
purchased by Canadians. 185 The possibility of splitting off the voting
rights on the control bloc and vesting those rights in Canadians is at-
tractive, particularly if the Canadians are well known to the foreign
parent through service on the Canadian board 186 and if such action
could make the Canadian enterprise "eligible".
The Agency has taken the view that the transfer of voting rights
without the corresponding transfer of equity ownership is not by itself
sufficient to change the ultimate control of the corporation.1 87 It is in-
teresting to speculate, however, whether a fixed commitment also to
dispose of the equity ownership over a reasonable period of time would
be viewed with more favour. In view of the availability of an opinion
under s. 4(1) it is conceivable that the Minister could bargain with the
foreign parent towards an acceptable formula for gradual Canadianiza-
tion. 188 To date there has been no publication of eligibility opinions. If
183 Sometimes this was required by statute, see, for example, the Companies Act (B.C.), 1973,
c. 18, s. 131.
I 4 The stock market has been recovering somewhat in 1975 but is still far below its peak of earl-
ier years.
185 It is possible to have constrained shares under both the Ontario and Federal Corporations Acts
but these have not been widely used. See the Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 53,
s. 47. Of course, if the shares were all acquired by foreign interests there might be a reviewa-
ble transaction that would be little solace to the selling shareholder. A private sale to Canadian
investors is sometimes not possible.
186 This appears to be the situation with respect to Bovis Corporation, see Hayden and Bums, 3-
1.
187 This statement by the Commissioner, Richard Murray, reported in the Globe and Mail on
December 3, 1974 is quoted in Hayden and Bums, ibid.
188 Such an approach is foreshadowed in the Gray Report, p. 459 where it is suggested that the
reviewing authority might bargain for a joint venture with Canadians in certain cases. Note
this would give a positive role to the Minister because it is his opinion, not Cabinet's, under
s. 4(1). As the opinion is binding on the Minister, no remedies can be invoked. For a possible
example, see "SW of Canada's Citizenship Bid", The Financial Post, Feb. 22, 1975, p. 18.
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they became a positive instrument under the statute then publication
would assume a greater importance. ' 8 9
The three examples above are designed to indicate that the statute
and guidelines, if read literally, may not be tailored to deal with certain
problem situations. If the statutory language is read broadly and the
applicants as well as the government are willing to make adjustments
in order to fit the statutory provisions into a sensible over-all policy
framework, then the statute can and will work, even without amend-
ments. But the government will have to articulate policy more clearly
and there will have to be mechanisms developed so that interested par-
ties can be made aware of the current state of development. Represen-
tation from affected areas have been heard at the Bill stage but there is
a need for a continuous input. The worst thing that could happen would
be to have the application of the statute decided on narrow, technical
grounds and the criteria for significant benefit shrouded in mystery.
8. Conclusion
Many countries who have no anxiety as to their identity, who are
geographically distant from major sources of foreign investment and
who have a lower preponderance of foreign control than Canada, have
found it expedient by one means or another to review or limit invest-
ment by foreigners. 190 Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act is a
direct approach by Canada to set up a bureaucratic structure, with Cab-
inet control over ultimate decisions, to screen both foreign acquisitions
of existing Canadian businesses and new business ventures by foreign
interests in Canada. The legislation is innovative and demands from
both the Agency and the applicants flexibility and resilience if the
screening process is to be administered fairly and effectively. There is
every indication that both sides are exhibiting such flexibility and resil-
ience. It may be unfortunate that it was felt necessary to enshrine the
provisions relating to the applicability of the statute in such technical,
189 1 have not examined the thorny question of publication versus secrecy in any detail although I
have mentioned it with respect to publication of reasons for approvals and disapprovals. It
was recognized by the Minister before the statute was enacted, see Proceedings of the Senate
Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce (1973) 23:29. Section 14 of the stat-
ute prohibits disclosure except in limited circumstances and there is a specific offence in s. 25
for violation of s. 14. Hayden has put the case for disclosure quite forcefully, Hayden and
Bums, 2,003-1 et seq. The disclosure of eligibility opinions may be more contentious than the
disclosure of reasons for decisions at the review stage.
190 Australia has legislation that is somewhat similar to the Canadian statute. Many countries,
such as the U.K., use currency controls instead of direct review of foreign investment. Even
the United States appears to be worried, see Young, "The Acquisition of United States Busi-
ness by Foreign Investors", 30 The Bus. Lawyer 11I, (1974), and see Penthouse Magazine,
March, 1975 pp. 50et seq.
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convoluted terminology. No doubt all the phrases are not apt for
application to all industries. Nevertheless the real basis of the statute is
working. The Cabinet does make decisions and even reverses itself.
The Agency has shown itself willing to challenge schemes of compli-
ance by avoidance but equally willing to communicate freely with any
applicant. So far no compelling case for statutory amendment has
emerged, in the sense that the system has been tested and found want-
ing. In such a new area, that is quite an achievement.
